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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globally harmonized prudential regulation and internationally 
driven secured transactions law reforms chart the normative premises 
sustaining credit-based economies. Oscillating between the need of 
expanding credit creation to promote economic growth and the 
urgency of controlling the excessive accumulation of debt, modern 
economies depend on private law rules and regulatory provisions that 
originate in different fora of the international lawmaking arena. Under 
the auspices and guidance of international organizations concerned 
with the alleviation of poverty,1 a growing number of jurisdictions 
across the globe have embarked – or are embarking – upon substantial 
legal reforms to facilitate credit expansion and financial inclusion 
through the establishment of proprietary entitlements, known as 
                                                                                                                       
1 . The efforts to harmonize and modernize secured transactions law contribute to 
achieving the first (“end poverty in all its forms everywhere”) of the seventeen sustainable 
development goals to be reached by 2030 by the international community; G.A. Res. 70/1, at 
15 (Oct. 21, 2015). The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda reiterating the relevance of international legal harmonization to reduce poverty and 
inequalities; G.A. Res. 69/313, ¶ 89 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
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“security interests” or “security rights,” over personal property.2 In 
essence, secured transactions law reforms aim at equipping creditors 
and debtors with legal tools that effectively reduce credit risk by 
placing secured creditors in a priority position vis-à-vis unsecured 
creditors and competing claimants. 3  Prudential regulation, through 
international regulatory standards, sets forth the amount of capital that 
– relative to the total investments and in proportion to the risks 
acquired – regulated deposit-taking institutions, for simplicity banks, 
must not fund with borrowed money. 4  The overarching aim is to 
                                                                                                                       
2. The list of countries that, in pursuit of these goals, have reformed or are in the process 
of reforming their secured transactions laws is lengthy and ranges across six continents, 
animating vibrant scholarly debates and policy analyses. For a forward-looking analysis of the 
development of secured transactions law internationally and comparatively, see generally 
Symposium, Secured Transactions Law in the 21st Century, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(Charles W. Mooney, Steven L. Schwarcz & Giuliano G. Castellano, special eds., 2018). For a 
critical account of the issues concerning secured transactions law reforms in several 
jurisdictions, see generally SECURED FINANCING IN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Frederique 
Dahan ed., 2015). For an examination of the economic effect of secured transactions law 
reforms in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, see, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, 
Secured Lending and Its Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 727 (2007). For an 
analysis of the reform debate in Europe, see, e.g., Tibor Tajti, Could Continental Europe Adopt 
a Uniform Commercial Code Article 9-type Secured Transactions System? The Effects of the 
Differing Legal Platforms, 35 ADEL. L. REV. 149 (2014). For an overview of the main issues 
affecting the reform debate at the national level in the United Kingdom, see, e.g., HUGH 
BEALE ET AL., THE LAW OF SECURITY AND TITLE-BASED FINANCING ¶¶ 23.01-23.22 (2d ed. 
2012). 
3 . The core purpose of curbing credit risk associated to secured transactions is 
recognized in virtually any legal system. In the United States, see LYNN M. LOPUCKI & 
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH xxxi (7th ed. 2012); Ronald J. 
Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646 (1997); Grant 
Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 29 (1951). In Canada, see RONALD C. CUMING, CATHERINE WALSH & 
RODERICK J. WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAW 1 (2005). Under English law, see 
BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, ¶ 1.09; SIR ROY GOODE, GOODE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
CREDIT AND SECURITY ¶ 1-01 (Louise Gullifer ed., 5th ed. 2013). The core legal body of the 
U.N. system, i.e. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
consider the reduction of credit risk associated to secured transactions as essential to promote 
access to credit worldwide. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), 
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2 (2008) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE] 
(noting that “[r]isk is reduced because credit secured by assets gives creditors access to the 
assets as another source of recovery in the event of non-payment of the secured obligation”). 
4. In common parlance, capital requirements are often referred to as the capital that 
banks should “set aside.” This locution should be used with the caveat that capital 
requirements do not demand banks to hold some portion of their deposits, which is what 
“liquidity requirements” and “reserves” (outside the scope of this Article) impose. Instead, 
capital for banks is what other firms is term as “equity” and equity-like instruments, i.e. “own 
funds.” This point is eloquently illustrated by ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE 
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ensure that banks maintain sufficient funds to insulate depositors from 
unexpected losses and promote financial stability by controlling the 
level of risk taken by banks.5 These branches of law intersect when 
banks secure the repayment of loans with collateral. Yet, from a 
regulatory perspective, not all security rights are considered to offer 
sufficient protection against credit risk. 
An inconsistency, if not a fully-fledged paradox, surfaces in the 
international and national legal frameworks governing credit: core 
legal devices designed by private law rules to reduce credit risk may 
be considered, under capital requirements, inapt to curb credit risk 
and, thus, equated to unsecured credit. At first blush, the different 
treatments of collateral may appear symptomatic of a clash between 
broad policy objectives, namely, economic growth (stimulated 
through access to credit) and financial stability. A closer examination, 
however, reveals a tension that is more profound than a mere 
balancing exercise between two policy objectives. 
The main argument of this Article is that dissonances between 
secured transactions law and capital requirements stem from their 
different ethoi and hinder both access to credit and financial stability 
worldwide. To sustain this argument and advance the debate in both 
fields of law,6 it is necessary, first, to isolate the rationales and the 
                                                                                                                       
BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6-7 
(2014). 
5 . See HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, 
POLICY AND REGULATION 575 (21st ed. 2016); RICHARD S. CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY 
& GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 251 (4th ed. 
2009); Michael B. Gordy, Erik A. Heitfield & Jason Wu, Risk-Based Regulatory Capital and 
the Basel Accords, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 550-66 (Allen N. Berger et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2014); JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 290-315 
(2016). 
6. In spite of the decades-old plea for a deeper coordination, the intersection between 
these two sets of norms has not been the object of scrupulous investigations. In particular, Sir 
Roy Goode noted: “[t]he harmonisation of private law affecting credit will lose much of its 
value if it does not proceed hand in hand with harmonisation of public regulation.” Roy Goode, 
A Credit Law for Europe?, 23 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 227, 236 (1974). The debate has been 
recently reinvigorated by new evidence indicating the role of secured transactions law and 
capital requirements in creating credit. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Credit 
Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
(forthcoming 2018). UNCITRAL has recently recognized the relevance of the issue and future 
work that results in a text containing specific guidance to national regulatory authorities on 
capital requirements. See Giuliano G. Castellano & Marek Dubovec, Coordinating Secured 
Transactions Law and Capital Requirements in U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
MODERNISING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW TO SUPPORT INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABLE 
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operational logics of secured transactions law and capital 
requirements. The narrative sustaining and justifying the law of 
secured transactions is rooted in the idea that security interests, 
especially those in personal property, are the core engine for 
economic growth as they redress the problem of “dead capital;”7 that 
is, the mismatch between the assets held by individuals or companies 
and the assets that financiers are willing to accept as collateral. 
Through this lens, international organizations have been actively 
engaged in promoting law reforms that establish legal regimes that 
facilitate the conversion of dead capital into productive capital. The 
underlying assumption is that by preferring secured creditors over 
unsecured creditors, the use of collateral is facilitated and more credit 
is extended at a lower cost. Hence, law reformers strive to design a 
legal regime in which creditors and debtors are able to negotiate the 
terms of their consensual transactions to fit their idiosyncratic 
financing needs and risk appetites, while mandatory rules are largely 
imposed having in view the effects of security rights on third parties. 
As illustrated in this Article, such a rationale permeates national laws 
and the international legal standards adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”).8 
Capital requirements follow a different rationale that is 
encapsulated in their preventive, or prudential, function. They are 
defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel 
Committee) – housed in the Bank for International Settlements 
(“BIS”) – to ensure capital adequacy of internationally active banks.9 
                                                                                                                       
DEVELOPMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 166, (Vienna, 4-6 July 2017),  http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/congress/17-06783_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TGS-79FK] (archived Mar. 1, 2018); 
REPORT of the U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), on its Fiftieth Session (3-
21 July 2017), ¶¶ 222-23 U.N. Doc A/72/17 (2017). 
7. The term was coined by the economist Hernando de Soto. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, 
THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS 
EVERYWHERE ELSE (3d ed. 2000). 
8. On the origins of UNCITRAL and its early work, see generally John Carey, 
UNCITRAL: Its Origins and Prospects, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 626 (1967); Allan E. Farnsworth, 
UNCITRAL-Why? What? How? When?, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 314 (1972). On the EBRD, see 
Steven Weber, Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 48 INT’L 
ORG. 1 (1994). 
9 . On the genesis of the Basel Committee, see CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997 (2011). 
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When transposed into national legal systems, capital requirements are 
imposed on credit institutions with the intent of preventing excessive 
risk-taking, which may have detrimental implications for the stability 
of individual banks and the entire financial system.10 This translates 
into two main areas of regulatory intervention, consisting of micro-
prudential and macro-prudential regulation, and concerning, 
respectively, the solvency of individual banks and the stability of the 
entire financial system. Upon these premises, mandatory requirements 
are established, imposing a statutory limit on the ratio of “un-
borrowed” funds, such as equity, to borrowed funds, such as deposits. 
The amount and the composition of banks’ own capital is calculated 
against the risks posed by their operations. By controlling the risk 
associated with lending, capital requirements influence the lending 
choices of individual banks, which may divert their funds towards 
activities subject to lower capital requirements.11 
The two aforementioned rationales develop into distinctive 
operational logics. Security instruments are consensual arrangements 
established to curb credit risk. They are governed by private law rules 
that are concerned with the nexus of rights and obligations created 
through a security agreement. In contrast, capital requirements are 
regulatory provisions that focus on the internal processes that banks 
must deploy to evaluate the riskiness of any given lending operation, 
with or without collateral, in order to determine the corresponding 
capital charge. Accordingly, the law pertaining to secured transactions 
assumes that, inasmuch as private law rules are conducive to private 
negotiations, a security right reduces credit risk. Whereas, capital 
requirements are designed to control the level of risk taken by 
individual banks and consider collateral to reduce credit risk only if 
                                                                                                                       
On the Basel Committee’s role within the modern global governance system, see CHRIS 
BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW AND FINANCIAL 
ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 99-102 (2014). 
10. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 87; Gordy, Heitfield & Wu, supra note 5, 
at 550. 
11. For an accurate analysis of the incentives created by capital regulation in the context 
of the Global Financial Crisis, see generally Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the 
International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel 
Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 3 (2014). See also Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: 
Reconciling Legal and Regulatory Incentives, supra note 6 (noting that international capital 
requirements affect the cost of creating new loans and the lack of coordination with secured 
transactions law distorts the incentive for providing commercial loans). 
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specific statutory criteria are met. Hence, when secured transactions 
law and capital requirements are approached in a compartmentalized 
fashion, a hiatus emerges that, in turn, manifests itself in two distinct 
understandings of what constitutes an effective protection against 
credit risk. 
To address this gap, this Article examines the regulatory 
treatment of security rights in personal property with primary 
reference to international legal and regulatory standards. The 
provisions enshrined in the UNCITRAL and the EBRD model laws 
are measured against the requisites that collateralized transactions 
must satisfy in order to benefit from discounted capital charges, 
pursuant to the Second Basel Capital Accord (“Basel II”)12 and the 
Third Basel Capital Accord (“Basel III”).13 Given the different levels 
of implementation of these standards at the national level, different 
methodological approaches are required to investigate their 
interaction. Secured transactions laws of selected jurisdictions – 
belonging to civil law and common law legal families – are 
considered. Specific attention is given to legal and regulatory 
frameworks of the European Union and its Member States. In the EU, 
in fact, secured transactions laws are disharmonized while capital 
requirements are harmonized and largely based on Basel II that is, in 
turn, applied to any credit institution operating in the European single 
market through the Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD IV”) 
and the Capital Requirements Regulation (“CRR”). 14  Where 
departing from international principles, Belgian, English, French and 
                                                                                                                       
12. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED 
FRAMEWORK (rev. 2006) [hereinafter BASEL II]. 
13. The process to amend Basel II started in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, leading, in 2011, to the adoption of the first instrument that eventually became known as 
Basel III. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (rev. 
2011) [hereinafter BASEL III (2011)]. In December 2017, after extensive negotiations, Basel III 
has been completed and its final version was formally adopted. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS (2017) [hereinafter 
BASEL III]. 
14. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. L 176/338 [hereinafter CRD IV]; Council Regulation 
575/2013, on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and 
Amending Regulation 648/2012, 2013 O.J. L 176/1 [hereinafter CRR]. 
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Italian laws governing non-possessory security rights over tangibles, 
financial assets and receivables are examined through the prism of the 
principles established by the CRR. This systematic approach allows 
us to identify specific dissonances between secured transactions law 
and capital requirements. These dissonances affect the terms of a 
security agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties, the public 
filing regime for security rights and their enforcement. As illustrated 
in detail in this Article, the uncoordinated intersection between these 
two branches of law hinders the effectiveness of reforms aimed at 
expanding access to credit and inducing the development of 
unregulated credit markets. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II, in 
defining the boundaries of this investigation, unveils the hiatus 
between the rationales and the inner logics underpinning personal 
property secured transactions law and prudential regulation. Part III 
focuses on the intersection between the two areas by examining the 
regulatory treatment of security rights in receivables, financial 
collateral and tangible assets. Part IV offers an analysis of the 
consequences of the uncoordinated coexistence of secured 
transactions laws and capital requirements on access to credit and 
financial stability. 
II. TWO RATIONALES 
As secured transactions laws of various legal systems undergo a 
process of reform and the debate over the recently adopted revision of 
harmonized capital requirements has animated the global political 
debate, 15  the need for adequate understanding of the interactions 
                                                                                                                       
15. As a testament to their local impact, secured transactions law reforms generally hit 
the headlines in local news. The international limelight is reserved to the Basel Committee 
efforts to furthering the reforms process started in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
The intention is to implement a package of new reforms to complete Basel III. However, the 
proposed changes have been perceived so radical that the document presented have been 
dubbed as Basel IV. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. Different rounds of negotiations, 
amid a mutating political environment, have blocked the process of changes with European 
countries and the U.S. often struggling to find an alignment. See, e.g., Caroline Binham & Jim 
Brunsden, France Hardens Stance Against Higher Bank Capital Requirements, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/ee8f42eb-422a-3dc9-92a2-8ceb7d9fb4ef; Julia-
Ambra Verlaine, Global Financial Regulation Faces Uncertain Future After Trump’s Order, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-financial-regulation-faces-
uncertain-future-after-trumps-order-1486405041; Caroline Binham & Emma Dunkley, Basel 
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between these two fields of law intensifies. The tension between the 
policy objectives pursued by secured transactions laws and prudential 
regulation offers only a superficial explanation of the chasm 
separating these two sets of legal rules.  
It is acknowledged that secured transactions law chiefly aims at 
broadening access to credit, promoting economic growth; whereas, 
prudential regulation focuses on curbing the risks associated with 
lending operations in order to ensure financial stability. However, if 
the inconsistencies resulting from this divide are reduced to a clash 
between policy objectives, advancements in the discourse would be 
obstructed by an alleged dichotomy between economic growth and 
financial stability. Following this conceptualization, swift policy 
recommendations are often advanced. Depending on the favored 
position, a relaxation of capital requirements may be suggested, 
arguably to promote economic growth, 16  or the desirability of 
comprehensive legal reforms to support credit creation may be 
questioned, supposedly with the intent of inducing financial stability. 
This understanding, however, results in a practical impasse, given that 
it is assumed that the two objectives cannot be achieved 
simultaneously. More profoundly, it neglects that stability is a 
precondition for sustained growth. 17  These two overarching 
                                                                                                                       
Postpones Bank Reform Vote Amid Policy Differences, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/589f1ce0-d1a1-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51. Finally, on December 7, 
2017, the oversight body of the Basel Committee, i.e. the Governors and Heads of Supervision, 
announced the completion of Basel III, signaling that a political agreement has been reached 
over the reform process initiated after the global financial crisis. See Press Release, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Governors and Heads of Supervision Finalise Basel III 
Reforms (December 7, 2017). 
16. As reported by ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 9, a plea for a relaxation of 
capital requirements is often vented by the industry. This stance is also manifested in the 
industry’s responses to public consultations concerning international capital requirements. In 
this respect, the Basel Committee often took into account whether different proposals for 
reform have a negative impact on lending to small business. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDISED 
APPROACH FOR CREDIT RISK 10 (2015) [hereinafter CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT]. More 
recently, it has been often advanced the idea that capital regulation is holding back economic 
growth by limiting lending activities or that with new capital requirements banks would be 
“forced” to limit lending activities; see, e.g., Gernot Heller, G20 Review of Banking Rules No 
Rollback of Regulation: Weidmann, REUTERS Mar. 19, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-g20-germany-weidmann-idUSKBN16Q0L5 [https://perma.cc/UW85-Z59W] (archived Mar. 
1, 2018). 
17. The point is clearly illustrated with reference to the 2007-2009 financial crisis by 
ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 5. 
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objectives are, in fact, interwoven, as the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (“FSAP”) of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank highlights. 18  According to the FSAP, secured credit and the 
protection of creditors’ rights are core components of the legal 
framework sustaining the soundness of financial systems. 19  More 
specifically, a modern legal regime for secured transactions is 
considered to be a factor that facilitates stable economic growth and 
recovery, especially when it expands financing opportunities for small 
and medium-sized enterprises.20 In a similar vein, balancing financial 
stability and economic growth underscores the definition of an 
optimal level of mandatory capital reserves that banks must hold.21 
Hence, capital requirements aim at ensuring the stability of both 
individual banks and the banking system as a whole, without stifling 
banks’ ability to support credit-based economies. In the aftermath of 
recent financial crises, concerns over financial stability animated the 
international policy agenda and led to questions of whether capital 
requirements have been excessively low, thereby resulting in a call 
for the reassessment of the Basel Accords.22 Although a first wave of 
changes contained in the first Basel III instrument adopted in 2011 
addressed a number of significant issues, negotiations concerning 
more fundamental aspects have been completed only after several 
                                                                                                                       
18. See IMF, Review of the Financial Sector Assessment Program: Further Adaptation 
to the Post-Crisis Era Policy Paper, (Sept. 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/
pp/eng/2014/081814.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB6Z-SL5A] (archived Mar. 1, 2018). 
19. IMF & WORLD BANK, Financial Sector Assessment:  A Handbook 230 (2005). 
20. See Spiros V. Bazinas, Richard M. Kohn & Louis F. Del Duca, Facilitating a Cost-
Free Path to Economic Recovery—Implementing a Global Uniform International Receivables 
Financing Law, 44 UCC L. J. 277, 279 (2012) (noting that the possibility of securing loans 
with personal property is essential to stimulate economic growth and recovery in developed 
and developing economies alike). See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, REPORT ON SMES 
AND SME SUPPORTING FACTOR (2016). In Europe, economic growth and recovery have been 
linked to the availability of financing for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), given 
that ninety-nine out of one hundred businesses in Europe are SMEs. On the benefits of secured 
transactions law for SMEs and micro-businesses, see Kozolchyk, supra note 2, at 731 (noting 
that “where commercial credit is available to small- and medium-sized enterprises, micro-
enterprises can also become its beneficiaries and poverty is thereby further alleviated”). 
21. IMF, Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/16/04, 
(Mar. 2016). 
22. A study conducted by IMF staff members suggests that doubling, and in certain cases 
tripling, capital requirements would have been sufficient to absorb losses in most of the past 
banking crises. Id. at 20. 
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years of extensive consultations. 23  With the adoption of the final 
version of Basel III in 2017, the Basel Committee initiated the 
implementation phase. Notwithstanding the efforts to enhance both 
accuracy and precision in the mechanisms to calculate capital 
requirements, the Basel framework for personal property collateral 
remains largely unaffected by the recent reforms and, as such, is still 
anchored to the framework established prior to the recent financial 
crises.  
At the root of the hiatus between the legal rules governing 
secured transactions laws and international regulatory standards are 
the radically different rationales and operational logics that generate 
dissonances when applied simultaneously, i.e. when banks act as 
secured creditors while complying with capital requirements. These 
two branches of law are both aimed at reducing credit risk, but they 
are characterized by different attitudes towards the level of risk that 
the banks are allowed to undertake, as it emerges when their core 
mechanisms and evolution are examined. 
A. Secured Transactions Law: National Reforms and International 
Models 
In recent years, national legislators have – more or less 
successfully – attempted to reorganize the maze of national rules 
governing security rights in personal property. The common 
denominator of these reforms is the pursuit of legal simplification and 
certainty through a more cohesive apparatus of rules in which 
functionally similar secured transactions are subjected to similar legal 
                                                                                                                       
23.  During the negotiation phase, the proposals advanced by the Basel Committee were 
informally labeled as “Basel IV” in consideration of the relevance of the changes that they 
entailed. Basel IV typically indicated a package of proposed reforms contained in a series of 
documents. The most relevant set of proposals for the purpose of this investigation are 
contained in BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SECOND CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO THE STANDARDISED APPROACH FOR CREDIT RISK (2015) 
[hereinafter SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT] and in the BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: REDUCING VARIATION IN CREDIT RISK-
WEIGHTED ASSETS – CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF INTERNAL MODEL APPROACHES (2016) 
[hereinafter IRB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT]. Most of the proposals advanced by the Basel 
Committee, including those contained in the aforementioned documents, have been ultimately 
adopted by the Basel Committee and are included in Basel III. See Marcel Magnus, Benoit 
Mesnard & Alienor Duvillet-Margerit, Upgrading the Basel Standards: From Basel III to 
Basel IV?, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 18, 2017), for a useful summary of the debate prior 
to the final adoption of Basel III.  
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treatment and ultimately to a unitary legal framework. 24  Legal 
rationalization is ubiquitous in secured transactions law reforms, 
regardless of whether national law reformers: (1) intend to emulate 
the legal regimes of Canada and the United States that pioneered the 
unitary framework lauded by many; 25  (2) were driven by an 
international impetus involving the adoption of international 
standards, such as those elaborated by the EBRD and UNCITRAL;26 
or (3) explored a different reform strategy.27 Even within the same 
region, legal frameworks are substantially different and countries may 
be at different stages of the reform process. In Europe, for instance, 
several countries have reformed national laws along the lines of the 
EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions (“EBRD Model Law”), 
                                                                                                                       
24. Simplification was one of the motivating objectives of the drafters of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States; see Karl N. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying 
Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 687, 690 (1948). For a cogent parallel between the 
UCC experience and the international process of harmonization and simplification of secured 
transactions law, see Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The 
Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173 (1998). 
25. See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 295 (1965). 
This option has influenced the debate in numerous legal systems belonging to different legal 
traditions. For instance, in the United Kingdom, see generally Iwan Davies, The Reform of 
Personal Property Security Law: Can Article 9 of the US Uniform Commercial Code be a 
Precedent?, 37 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 465 (1988). In Central European countries, see Tajti, 
supra note 2. In France, see generally, JEAN FRANÇOIS RIFFARD, LE SECURITY INTEREST OU 
L’APPROCHE FONCTIONNELLE ET UNITAIRE DES SÛRETÉS MOBILIÈRES: CONTRIBUTION À 
UNE RATIONALISATION DU DROIT FRANÇAIS (1997) (Fr.). Finally, in Latin America, see 
Marek Dubovec, UCC Article 9 Registration System for Latin America, 28 ARIZONA J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 117 (2011). 
26. On the principles of the EBRD MODEL LAW, see infra note 42, see Frederique Dahan, 
Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: The Transplantation of Secured Transactions 
Laws, 2 EUR J. L. REFORM 369 (2000). For an example of the influence of UNCITRAL 
instruments in guiding national reforms, in the African context, see e.g., Marek Dubovec and 
Cyprian Kambili, Secured Transactions Reform in Malawi – The 2013 Personal Property 
Security Act in SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW REFORM: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICE 391 (Louise Gullifer & Orkun Akseli eds., 2016) [hereinafter STLR: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICE]. 
27. As an alternative to the blunt transposition of North American models, different 
strategies have been utilized. In the European context, see generally Giuliano G. Castellano, 
Reforming Non-Possessory Secured Transactions Laws: A New Strategy? 78 MOD. L. REV. 
611 (2015) (indicating the reform of publicity rules, with the implementation of a filing system 
to regulate priority represents a viable reform strategy to start more comprehensive reforms in 
many European jurisdictions). 
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e.g., Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 28  In Belgium, a new law 
inspired by international standards was recently adopted with the 
intent of rationalizing the regime established by the civil code.29 In 
France, the work of the Grimaldi Commission led to a partial reform 
of the civil and commercial codes and further amendments are 
expected to align French secured transactions law with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.30 Similarly, in Italy, a new non-possessory 
pledge was introduced, albeit more comprehensive reforms are 
demanded by many. 31 In the United Kingdom, secured transaction 
law is not in line with international standards and reforms have been 
debated for over five decades.32 Although few statutory interventions 
have been made, the wind of change seems to be blowing again and 
new concrete proposals have been advanced for a more 
comprehensive reform of English law.33 In general, the number of 
                                                                                                                       
28. Katarína Mathernová, The Slovak Secured Transactions Reform: Ingredients of a 
Successful Reform and Reflection on its Achievements, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM 
AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 207 (Frederique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008). 
29. Loi modifiant le Code Civil en ce qui concerne les sûretés réelles mobilières et 
abrogeant diverses dispositions en cette matière [Act to Amend the Civil Code with Respect to 
Security Rights and to Repeal Various Security Provisions] of July 11, 2013, MONITEUR 
BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 2, 2013 [hereinafter Belgian Pledge Act]. 
The Act is not fully operational yet; for a comment, see Eric Dirix, The Belgian Reform on 
Security Interests in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 26 at 391; Ivan 
Peeters and Michiel de Muynck, Belgium Moves to Modernity but Only Half Way: The 
Introduction of New Legislation on Security Interests in Movable Assets, 29 J. INT’L BANKING 
& FIN. L. 75 (2014). 
30. See Jean François Riffard, The Still Uncompleted Evolution of the French Law on 
Secured Transactions towards Modernity, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 26, at 369; Muriel Renaudin, The Modernisation of French Secured Credit Law: 
Law as a Competitive Tool in Global Markets, 24 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 385 
(2013). 
31. Decreto Legge 30 giugno 2016, n. 119, G.U. Feb. 7, 2016, n. 153 (It.) [hereinafter 
Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law]. For an early analysis on the reform debate in Italy, see 
Guido Ferrarini, Changes to Personal Property Security Law in Italy: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 
477 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997). For a more recent comment, see Anna Veneziano, Italian 
Secured Transactions Law: the Need for Reform, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 355. 
32. The initiatives to reform English law may be traced back to the BOARD OF TRADE, 
REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749 (U.K.). A number of 
subsequent proposals have followed. For a complete account, see HUGH BEALE ET AL., supra 
note 2, ¶ 23.01ff. 
33 . A more comprehensive reform is advocated by the Secured Transactions Law 
Reform Project. See Secured Transactions Law Reform Project, Policy Paper, 
SECUREDTRANSACTIONSLAWREFORMPROJECT.ORG (Apr. 2016), https://stlrp.files.wordpress.
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legal systems – within and outside the European Union – that have 
adopted new laws, or are currently considering reforming their current 
legal regime to establish proprietary entitlements in personal property, 
is constantly growing. 
To North American lawyers – who are acquainted with the 
uniformity brought by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
by the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts – the lack of a 
harmonized, EU-wide legal framework for secured transactions might 
appear peculiar. In the European Union, the effort to harmonize 
national secured transactions laws has been confined within the 
European Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”), which in its 
Book IX elicits the core principles for a pan-European secured 
transactions law. 34  The DCFR, however, remains an academic 
exercise, as it has not been incorporated into any domestic legislation 
of EU Member States. Rather than providing a general legal 
framework for secured credit, EU legislatures have followed different 
avenues, harmonizing either rules pertaining to specific types of 
collateral and secured transactions or provisions related to areas that 
are contiguous to secured transactions law, and outside the scope of 
this investigation, such as retention of title clauses in the context of 
late payments and cross-border insolvency. 35  To the first category 
belongs the Financial Collateral Directive (“FCD”) that establishes a 
set of rules, implemented across the European Union, for transactions 
secured with credit claims and financial collateral, i.e. cash and 
financial instruments. 36  Although implemented to promote free 
                                                                                                                       
com/2016/05/str-general-policy-paper-april-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N3H-M77R] 
(archived Mar. 3, 2018). Moreover, the Financial Law Committee of the City of London Law 
Society has been pressing for the implementation of a Secured Transactions Law Code. See 
Richard Calnan, A Secured Transactions Code, 30 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 473 (2015). 
34. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2010) (2009) 
[hereinafter DCFR]; See generally ULRICH DROBNIG & OLE BÖGER, PROPRIETARY SECURITY 
IN MOVABLE ASSETS (2015). 
35. For an overview and critique of the EU legislative efforts to offer a harmonized legal 
framework for secured transactions, see Anna Veneziano, European Secured Transactions 
Law at a Cross-Road, in ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 405ff (Louise Gullifer & Stefan 
Vogenauer eds., 2014). On the EU cross-border insolvency regime, see generally Gerard 
McCormack, Something Old, Something New: Recasting the European Insolvency Regulation, 
79 MOD. L. REV. 121 (2016). 
36. Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 
on Financial Collateral Arrangements as Regards Linked Systems and Credit Claims, 2002 O.J. 
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movement of capital and financial stability within the European single 
market, the FCD touches upon some of the core aspects of national 
secured transactions laws. 37  Aside from some aspects concerning 
financial collateral, in the EU, secured transactions are governed by 
national laws. Court interpretations, doctrinaire constructions and 
statutory provisions define the traits of a variety of consensual 
instruments that secure the fulfillment of an obligation through an 
entitlement over collateral in every European Union jurisdiction. 
Charges, contractual liens and pledges are some of the fundamental 
security instruments encountered in European legal systems to take 
personal property as collateral.38 The list further expands when title-
based financing, such as financial leases and retention of title clauses, 
are considered. 39  Hence, with few and limited exceptions, like 
Belgium, 40 European legal systems have not attempted to adopt a 
unitary, functionally-based approach and different legal categories 
and security instruments often coexist at the national level. 
1. The Rationale of Secured Transactions Law: Party Autonomy and 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
Absent an internationally harmonized secured transactions law, 
its ethos is to be sought in the core areas that are common to any legal 
framework regulating security rights over personal property. These 
areas pertain to: (1) the creation of security rights over a wide range 
of assets without dispossession of the debtor; (2) the priority status of 
security rights against competing claims; (3) the enforcement of 
security rights through judicial or extra-judicial mechanisms; and (4) 
                                                                                                                       
L. 168/43, as amended by Directive 2009/44/EC, 2009 O.J. L. 146/37 and by Directive 
2014/59/EU, 2014 O.J. L. 173/190 [hereinafter FCD]. 
37. On the issues related to the implementation of the FCD, see e.g., Louise Gullifer, 
What Should We Do About Financial Collateral?, 65 C.L.P. 377 (2012). 
38 . See, e.g., Castellano, supra note 27, at 614-16 (noting that even if even if the 
commercial use of these different security instruments is substantially similar, considerably 
different legal rules apply, depending on the formal categorization of each and every 
instrument). 
39. On the variety of instruments belonging to this category, see 2 PHILIP R. WOOD, 
COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND TITLE FINANCE ¶¶ 33-003ff (2007). On 
leasing in US law, see Peter W. Schroth, Financial Leasing of Equipment in the Law of the 
United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 323 (2010). 
40.  On the Belgian reform, see generally, supra note 29. 
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the public disclosure of the potential existence of security rights.41 In 
general terms, promoting private negotiations is the primary rationale 
of secured transactions law. Hence, party autonomy represents a 
fundamental tenet that permeates, to a different extent, all these four 
areas. Nonetheless, limits to contractual autonomy result from a 
balance, underscoring various legal rules, among the interests of the 
parties affected by the security instrument. The provisions elaborated 
by UNCITRAL offer a privileged perspective to illustrate these points. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions 
(“UNCITRAL Model Law”) – adopted in July 2016 – epitomizes the 
ongoing effort to assist national law reformers in “modernizing,” to 
use UNCITRAL’s terminology, their secured transactions laws.42 The 
pivot of the UNCITRAL Model Law is the extensive deference to 
party autonomy. Following a unitary, functionally-based approach, 
any proprietary entitlement in personal property (movable assets) 
“that is created by an agreement to secure payment or other 
performance of an obligation” is considered a security right, 
regardless of the denomination attributed to it by the parties.43 This 
                                                                                                                       
41. These core elements emerge from various international standards. See Core 
Principles for a Secured Transactions Law, EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., 
http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395238854769&d=&pagename=EBRD%
2FContent%2FDownloadDocument (last visited Oct. 23, 2017); WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES 
FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR/DEBTOR REGIMES (2016); UN COMM’N ON 
INT’L TRADE (UNCITRAL) LEGISLATIVE GUIDE. ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2010). In the 
literature, see John Armour, The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons 
for European Lawmaking? in THE FUTURE OF SECURED CREDIT IN EUROPE 14 (Horst 
Eidenmüller & Eva Maria Kieninger eds., 2008). 
42. UNCITRAL’S terminology differs from the one adopted by North American legal 
systems. For instance, in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, “security 
interests” are referred to as “security rights,” “secured parties” as “secured creditors,” 
“collateral” as “encumbered asset,” and “debtor” as “grantor.” MODEL LAW ON SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS 102, 9 (UNCITRAL 2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]. 
43 . UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 2(ii). The EUREuropean Bank for 
Reconstruction & Dev., Model Law on Secured Transactions does not adopt a functional 
approach. Instead, art. 6.1 recognizes three types of charges: a registered charge, an unpaid 
vendor’s charge and a possessory charge. See MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 6.1 
(EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV. 2004) [hereinafter EBRD MODEL LAW]. 
Likewise, the DCFR follows a functional approach, whilst distinguishing between “security 
right in movable assets” and “retention of ownership devices.” DCFR supra note 35, ch. IX, § 
1. In contrast, the Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, retained the traditional nomenclature of 
security rights, including the terms and concepts of pledge (droit de gage/pandrecht), retention 
of title (réserve de propriété/eigendomsvoorbehoud) and legal lien (droit de 
rétention/retentierecht). 
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means that consensual security instruments performing similar 
economic functions are subjected to the same legal treatment and the 
parties to a security agreement are not required to establish the correct 
formal qualification of their transaction in order to determine the 
relevant legal treatment. 44  Additionally, minimal requirements are 
imposed to create a security right. For instance, a general description 
of the encumbered assets is sufficient. 45  The principles of party 
autonomy and minimal formalities influence different rules, such as 
those governing perfection, i.e. effectiveness against third parties and 
the enforcement of security rights. Parties are, thus, free to choose 
either control or registration to perfect their security rights in financial 
collateral.46 In turn, registration, for any kind of collateral, follows a 
notice-filing approach, whereby a standardized form requiring 
skeletal information suffices to achieve perfection.47 Therefore, the 
registry represents a tool to promote private negotiations by 
publicizing the potential existence of a security right and by generally 
determining the priority following the first-to-file principle.48 Party 
autonomy is buttressed not solely by provisions affecting the secured 
creditor-debtor relationship, it also extends to the relationship 
between two secured creditors who might consensually alter their 
order of priority, i.e. in a subordination agreement. 49  Hence, the 
                                                                                                                       
44. STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 84-85 (6th ed. 2015); ANTHONY J. 
DUGGAN & JACOB S. ZIEGEL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY: CASES, 
TEXT, AND MATERIALS 20-21 (6th ed. 2013). For an argument to extend the scope of 
application beyond the functional equivalents to long-term leases and commercial 
consignments, see Catherine Walsh, Transplanting Article 9: The Canadian PPSA Experience, 
in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 49, 83-85. 
45. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 6 & 9; See EBRD MODEL LAW, 
supra note 43, art. 5.5. 
46. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 26; DCFR, supra note 34, ch. IX, 
§ 3:204. FCD states: “Member States shall not require that the creation, validity, perfection, 
enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement or the 
provision of financial collateral under a financial collateral arrangement be dependent on the 
performance of any formal act.” FCD, supra note 36, art. 3. In Belgium, a security right in 
receivables may be perfected by control when the secured creditor notifies the receivables 
obligor. See Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 60. 
47. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 18; DCFR, supra note 34, ch. IX, 
§ 3:102(1). 
48. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 19(2), 23 & 24; DCFR, supra note 
34, ch. IX, § 4:101(2). 
49. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 41; DCFR supra note 34, ch. IX, § 
4:108(1). 
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underlying rationale of the Model Law is that by establishing a 
simplified set of rules that clearly defines the rights and obligations of 
the parties entering into, or affected by, a secured transaction, private 
negotiations are facilitated. In this regard, parties are free to satisfy 
their idiosyncratic interests and risk appetites. 
2. Beyond Party Autonomy: Balancing Conflicting Interests 
National legal regimes may depart from the principles enshrined 
in the UNCITRAL or EBRD model laws. Nonetheless, a common 
operational logic may be isolated. The various rules regulating 
creation, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security rights are 
ultimately concerned with striking a balance among (often) antithetic 
interests of three categories of affected parties, namely debtors, 
secured creditors and competing claimants who may be buyers of the 
collateral and creditors who have acquired an interest in the collateral 
under a court decision. In addition, national bankruptcy laws insert 
into the mix another category of competing claimants, i.e. preferential, 
or statutory, claimants, which include employees for owed wages and 
tax authorities. As different interests are balanced, party autonomy 
results necessarily limited. The degree of this limitation varies across 
legal systems. 
In consideration of the historical and cultural contexts in which a 
given rule developed, a greater level of protection to one of these 
categories is granted. A few examples will illustrate this point. In 
North American legal systems, the concept of “commercial 
reasonableness” serves as a check against the great degree of freedom 
accorded to secured creditors to determine the method and manner of 
disposition of the collateral.50 Under English common law, the core 
distinction between floating and fixed charges has been developed by 
courts precisely to balance different interests.51 In fact, a charge is 
characterized as floating if the debtor maintains control over the 
collateral. However, in such a circumstance, the secured creditor 
(charge holder) enjoys a lower priority status, as compared to the 
holder of a fixed charge, and part of the charged assets must be 
                                                                                                                       
50. CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 29; HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 44, 
at 638. 
51. On the distinction between floating and fixed charges, among others, see GOODE, 
supra note 3, at 136. 
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apportioned to unsecured creditors.52 Another example of this balance 
is offered by the rules concerning the rights of buyers over 
encumbered assets sold outside the ordinary course of business. 
Pursuant to Article 26 of the Model Registry Provisions in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, a security right is not extinguished when the 
encumbered asset is sold by the debtor outside the ordinary course of 
business without the authorization of the secured creditor. However, 
if further proprietary entitlements are created on the same asset, 
striking the balance between different interests becomes more 
problematic. If the buyer creates a security right in the purchased 
asset in favor of another creditor, the buyer’s secured creditor would 
encounter difficulties in ascertaining the existence of prior security 
rights because searching the registry against the identifier of the buyer 
would not disclose the encumbrance created by the seller of the 
asset.53 Hence, the rule that allows for a security right to continue 
without an amendment of the registered notice that adds the buyer as 
the new grantor after the collateral has been transferred favors the 
first secured creditor over the transferee’s secured creditors. The logic 
of this rule is that the transferee’s secured creditor should have 
conducted due diligence beyond the registry record. However, the 
desire to protect the secured creditors of the buyer, inter alia, has led 
legislators to design a rule that imposes a duty on the secured creditor 
of the seller to amend the registered notice within a period of time 
after the sale of the asset.54 
Further limits to party autonomy emerge in different contexts. 
For instance, civil codes belonging to the Romano-Germanic tradition 
often limit secured creditors’ freedom to secure their loans with 
excessive collateral.55 Although common law systems typically allow 
secured creditors to avail themselves of any remedies set forth in the 
                                                                                                                       
52. Insolvency Act, 1986 (as amended), c. 45, § 175 & 176A, sch. B1, ¶ 65(2) (Eng.) 
[hereinafter Insolvency Act]. 
53. UNCITRAL, GUIDE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURITY RIGHTS REGISTRY 
51-52 (2014) [hereinafter REGISTRY GUIDE]. 
54. See CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, at 263. Moreover, Walsh notes that 
“…requiring the record to be updated only once actual knowledge is acquired would seem to 
offer sufficient protection to subsequent secured creditors.” Walsh, supra note 44 at 75. 
55. A practice known as overcollateralization. See Tajti, supra note 2, at 175; Brinkmann, 
The Peculiar Approach of German Law in the Field of Secured Transactions and Why it has 
Worked (So Far), in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 339, 346. 
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security agreement, 56  in civilian traditions, enforcement rules and 
procedures are often statutorily determined and may not be waived by 
the parties. 57  Limitations to contractual freedom as a result of a 
balancing exercise among different interests also emerge from the 
discussion concerning the ability to create a security right in 
receivables when a ban on assignments has been agreed upon by the 
debtor and the obligor of the receivable, i.e. those who owe payment 
on a receivable. When a ban on assignment is statutorily overridden, 
the legal regime privileges – at the expense of the parties’ contractual 
freedom – the interests of debtors, who may then assign receivables 
irrespective of a restriction stipulated by the agreement that generated 
such receivables.58 
In consideration of the variety of legal solutions stemming from 
the rationale and the operational logic underscoring secured 
transactions regimes, international soft-laws represent a consensus 
among various, domestic legal doctrines and approaches. 59 Such a 
consensus, achieved in United Nations’ boardrooms populated by 
commercial law lawyers, is now tested against the requirements of 
prudential regulation. In fact, whilst the rules pertaining to secured 
transactions reflect a balance among the interests of different parties, 
it remains to be ascertained whether a given rule favoring one of the 
affected parties is to be preferred from a prudential regulatory 
                                                                                                                       
56. This is the case in English Law. See GOODE, supra note 3, ¶¶ 4-65. Contrast with 
Part 6 of UCC Article 9 that “departs from the UCC’s general emphasis on freedom of 
contract…contains a number of rules that cannot be waived or varied.” HARRIS & MOONEY, 
supra note 44, at 578. 
57. This is the case for Italy, where enforcement mechanisms are established by the law 
and vary depending on the security instrument deployed. The new non-possessory pledge 
allows secured creditors, if expressly established in the agreement, to retain possession of the 
encumbered assets or dispose of them, provided that debtors are compensated for any profit 
exceeding the secured value. See Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 31, art. 1(6). 
Moreover, DCFR ch. IX, § 7:101(2) requires that a security right is perfected before the 
secured creditor may enforce it if third parties are involved. Furthermore, § 7:102 states that: 
“As between the enforcing secured creditor and the security provider, the rules of this Chapter 
are mandatory, unless otherwise provided.” 
58. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 13. For the UK law, see Michael 
Bridge, The Nature of Assignment and Non-assignment Clauses, 132 L. Q. R. 67 (2016), 
noting that “the expected secondary legislation nullifying non-assignment clauses will restore 
the marketability in the area of receivables financing.” 
59. For an early contribution on the difficulties in reaching a consensus in this area, see 
Ulrich Drobnig, Study on Security Interests, 8 UNCITRAL Y.B. 171, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/131 
(1977) (and Annex). 
2018] ACCESS TO CREDIT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 551 
perspective. Addressing this core question will lead to a 
reconsideration of well-established legal principles, such as those 
defining the priority status of floating charges or the desirability of 
bans on assignments. More profoundly, it emerges that informed 
analyses of secured transactions law and its reform require taking into 
account the regulatory dimension affecting the extension of credit 
through the banking system. 
B. Prudential Regulation: Crisis-driven International Standards 
Prudential regulation, as it is the case for most regulatory 
interventions, performs an ambivalent role by accommodating 
conflicting interests with the objective of mitigating the risks 
associated with activities otherwise beneficial for society, like the 
extension of credit. Unlike other businesses however, banks are 
highly leveraged, with low levels of equity, and thus particularly 
exposed to the risk of default.60 Within a fractional-reserve system, 
banks hold only a portion of the capital raised and convert most of it 
into means of production. 61 Long-term investments, like loans, are 
                                                                                                                       
60. This is an inner feature of the banking business. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra 
note 4, at 51; CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 4, at 252; and JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 291 (noting that if banks were wholly funded by equity and in their balance 
sheets only liquid assets were permitted, they would not be able to operate and extend credit to 
the economy). As shown in detail in this Section, capital regulation is concerned precisely with 
reducing banks’ leverage and ensuring sufficient liquidity of banks, by increasing the amount 
of own funds. 
61. Traditional accounts indicate that banks are intermediaries, implying that new loans 
are created inasmuch as deposited savings are available. However, central bankers and leading 
economists have indicated that deposits are created through loans. This is because every time a 
loan is created a new deposit is also established. Given that deposits represent purchasing 
power, commercial banks in essence create money, broadly conceived. See, e.g., Michael 
McLeay et al., Money creation in the modern economy (BANK OF ENG, Quarterly Bulletin 
2014. Q. BULL. 2014); Todd Keister & James J. McAndrews, Why Are Banks Holding So 
Many Excess Reserves? Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 380, (2009). 
The limits to deposit creation (through loans) relates to market pressures and monetary policy 
constraints. See James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money” (Cowles 
Foundation for Research in Economics, Discussion Paper No. 159, 1963) (indicating reserves 
as one of the limits to the creation of loans). In legal scholarship the point has been noted by 
several commentators pointing at profound implications for financial regulation. See Robert 
Hockett & Saule Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) 
(describing the banking system as a public-private partnership in which public actors 
accommodate and monetize private liabilities); MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: 
RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016) (defining the relationship between banking, 
financial instability, and private money creation as the “money problem”); and Dan Awrey, 
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thus funded largely by short-term liabilities, like deposits. 62  As a 
result of this maturity mismatch in the balance sheets, banks are 
required to manage a variety of risks, most importantly, credit risk, i.e. 
the risk of borrowers not repaying their long-term obligations,63 and 
liquidity risk, i.e. the risk of not having sufficient cash to meet short-
term obligations. 64  Moreover, given the inner complexities 
characterizing modern banking activities, banks are increasingly more 
exposed to operational risk that is represented by the potential loss 
resulting from failures in internal processes and systems (including 
those deployed to manage the aforementioned risks) or from external 
events.65 Failures in the management of those risks may, depending 
on various factors, result in the default of individual banks with 
negative implications for depositors, other creditors and for the “real 
economy,” i.e. the part of the economic system concerned with the 
production and the trade of goods and services. Similarly, economic 
or financial turmoil may distress individual banks, generating an 
adverse feedback loop, whereby a diffused accruement of credit risk 
and a decline in available liquidity, due, for instance, to a contagion 
effect, hinder banks’ ability to manage risk and in turn exacerbate 
economic downturns. 66  In his seminal work, Hyman Minsky 
                                                                                                                       
Brother, Can You Spare a Dollar? Designing an Effective Framework for Foreign Currency 
Liquidity Assistance COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 934 (2017) (noting that, in the context of the 
Eurodollar market, the ability of financial institutions to create currency liabilities impacts on 
the ability of central banks to provide assistance in case of liquidity shortage). 
62. Even if banks do not lend out deposits, but they create credit, deposits can still be 
used to fund loans. Simply, the amount of savings held by a bank does not represent per se a 
limit to the banks’ ability of creating loans. For a discussion on this point and its implications 
on capital regulation, see Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and 
Regulatory Incentives, supra note 6.  
63. Credit risk is defined as the risk that borrowers may not meet their obligations and 
relates to non-trading activities. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CREDIT RISK 1 (2000). 
64. For an overview of the different connotations of liquidity in the banking system, see 
Kleopatra Nikolaou, Liquidity (Risk) Concepts: Definitions and Interactions (Eur. Cent. Bank, 
Working Paper No. 1008, 2009). 
65.  See BASEL III, supra note 13, at 128. 
66. The literature on bank crises is vast. Contagion is generally indented as a herd 
behavior, whereby investors (or depositors) simultaneously withdraw funds from financial 
institutions, regardless of whether those institutions are in distress. Thus, bank failures are not 
contingent on insolvency. Contagion is, in fact, a liquidity crisis, inherent to the financial 
institutions financed through short-term borrowing. See generally HAL S. SCOTT, 
CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS 
(2016) (highlighting that contagion has been the most destructive phenomenon in financial 
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advanced the idea that financial instability is a cyclical phenomenon 
that escalates through different phases fueled by an uncontrolled 
accumulation of debt that may become excessive and eventually 
cannot be repaid.67 Thus, the effective management of credit risk and 
maintenance of sufficient liquidity are essential for both the proper 
functioning of banks and the stability of the financial and economic 
systems. 
The core mechanism to manage those risks is represented by 
banks’ own funds that are traditionally divided into economic capital, 
determined by banks, and regulatory capital, prescribed by 
regulators.68 While banks have developed sophisticated techniques to 
calculate economic capital, the limited liability structure, together 
with corporate governance and compensation mechanisms, may 
incentivize managers to hold less capital.69 Given that own funds are 
more expensive than borrowed funds,70 management is incentivized 
                                                                                                                       
markets and played a critical role in the 2008 financial crisis). For the economic literature on 
the interplay between financial stability, liquidity and credit risk, see generally Douglas W. 
Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises, 60 J. FIN. 615 
(2005). 
67. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, CAN “IT” HAPPEN AGAIN? ESSAYS ON 
INSTABILITY AND FINANCE (2015) (1982). Similar considerations have been advanced by 
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES (1978). 
68. The distinction is ubiquitous in financial economics. See generally George G. 
Kaufman, Capital in Banking: Past, Present and Future, 5 J. FIN. SERV.. RES. 385 (1992). See 
FRANS DE WEERT, BANK AND INSURANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 21 (2011); PIETER 
KLAASSEN & IDZARD VAN EEGHEN, ECONOMIC CAPITAL: HOW IT WORKS AND WHAT EVERY 
MANAGER NEEDS TO KNOW 2 (2009). 
69. See INTERIM REPORT TO THE G7 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS (Financial Stability Forum 2008). For lucid analysis of the relationship between 
bank’s corporate governance and financial stability, see Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, 
Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Pay: Governance and Financial Stability Costs of a 
Symbiotic Relationship, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2015). For a behavioral approach explaining 
the incentives to acquire excessive risk, see Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, 
Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. 
STUD. 23 (2009). 
70. The Modigliani-Miller theorem on corporate finance posits that the value of a firm is 
not affected by its capital structure. Hence, whether a firm deploys primary equity or debt does 
impact, or has a minimal impact, on the cost of financing. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. 
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. 
REV. 261, 265-81 (1958). However, it is commonly recognized that for banks debt is less 
expensive than equity, due to lower taxes attached to debt instruments and because deposits 
are protected by, implicit or explicit, public guarantees. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at 
310-311; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 110-11. 
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to decrease the level of protection and instead engage in investments 
that maximize shareholders’ value and returns in the short term. This 
may result in excessive risk-taking, insufficient liquidity, and, 
ultimately, undercapitalization. It is precisely in an effort to address 
these issues that further mandatory requirements impose on banks an 
additional layer of capital, known as “regulatory capital.” 71 
Historically, regulatory capital – mirroring the role of economic 
capital – has been devised to perform a micro-prudential function; 
namely, to decrease the odds of an individual bank’s failure, both by 
strengthening its ability to absorb unexpected losses and by 
preventing excessive risk-taking.72 As demonstrated by the treatise of 
the recent developments in international capital requirements, 
prudential regulation has been increasingly geared to address the 
overall stability of the banking system. 73  Hence, the resulting 
regulatory framework is aimed at ensuring the soundness of 
individual banks (micro-prudential regulation) and the entire banking 
system (macro-prudential regulation) by controlling the amount of 
funds that banks can convert into investments. 
The preventive rationale of prudential regulation is reflected in 
the provisions establishing minimum capital requirements. In general 
terms, a bank’s regulatory capital should be, at any point in time, 
equal to (or greater than) a minimum level that is set through a fixed 
percentage of the bank’s overall economic resources, including loans 
and other investments. Because the value and the exposure associated 
with banks’ investments are floating, the amount and the composition 
of regulatory capital vary widely over time. For each and every 
lending operation, banks should calculate a capital charge, which is a 
percentage of the total amount of regulatory capital and is determined 
                                                                                                                       
71. See Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory 
Incentives, supra note 6, at n.60 and accompanying text, indicating that given that banks are 
considered to create credit, capital regulation represents a tool to control the creation of credit 
(and thus of debt) in the economy. 
72. On the distinction between micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulation, see 
infra note 106 and related treatise in the text. In general terms, the role of capital requirements 
is ascribed to the preventive function of prudential regulation, whereby rules are established to 
ensure the soundness of financial institutions. See ROSS CRANSTON, EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, 
KRISTIN VAN ZWIETEN, CHRISTOPHER HARE & THEODOR VAN SANTE, PRINCIPLES OF 
BANKING LAW 31 (3d ed. 2018) (noting, inter alia, that prudential regulation comprises the 
rules “to keep financial institutions safe and as a going concern”). 
73. See id and infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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in proportion to the level of risk, i.e. exposure, posed by that 
operation. 74  The basic formula to compute capital charges thus 
multiplies the regulatory capital percentage by the risk-weighted 
coefficient that is determined for any given lending operation. The 
operational logic characterizing this process may be defined as risk-
based. This means that capital requirements are crafted to ensure that 
higher risk exposures result in higher risk-weighted coefficients and 
thus higher capital charges. It follows that, differently from what has 
been noted for secured transactions law, in prudential regulation, the 
level of risk taken by banks is a matter of law and is governed through 
the statutory provisions prescribed by capital requirements. 
1. International Capital Requirements: Evolution and Current 
Approach 
Following a series of bank failures in the 1970s, the Basel 
Committee was tasked with the drafting of harmonized standards 
ensuring capital adequacy of internationally active banks. 75  The 
centerpiece of this effort is reflected in the Basel Capital Accords, 
representing an internationally coordinated set of administrative rules. 
Even though the Accords, like the UNCITRAL Model Law, are not 
legally binding under international law, they have been implemented 
as binding rules in most jurisdictions.76 Since the First Basel Accord 
(“Basel I”), adopted in 1988, the definition of minimum capital 
requirements has followed a tortuous path of multiple refinements, 
political compromises and critiques.77 Basel I – through a relatively 
straightforward methodology – achieved the primary objective of 
                                                                                                                       
74. For a discussion on the basic principles applicable to computing regulatory capital, 
see DE WEERT, supra note 68, at 75; Gordy, Heitfield & Wu, supra note 5, at 552. 
75. In particular, the Basel Committee was established in response to the failure and 
liquidation of the Herstatt Bank in 1974. The Herstatt Bank was liquidated by German 
authorities before it could satisfy its obligations owed to American counterparties. Its collapse 
was followed in the same year by the failure of the Franklin National Bank in New York, with 
ripple effects on international financial markets. See BRUMMER, supra note 9, at 99; 
GOODHART, supra note 9, at 31-35. 
76. For a progress report on the implementation of the Basel framework, see BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs247.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z48V-B5YB] (archived Mar. 3, 2018). 
77. For a critical appraisal of BASEL II and its development, see generally DANIEL K. 
TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(2008). 
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imposing a minimum threshold for regulatory capital (at eight 
percent). However, discrepancies in national implementations and the 
lack of sufficient risk-sensitivity to compute capital charges 
ultimately undermined its effectiveness – particularly with respect to 
maintaining consistency across jurisdictions – and led to its revision 
and replacement with the adoption of Basel II.78 
Basel II, initially published in 2004 and further revised in 2006, 
introduced a three-pillar structure. 79  The first pillar defined new 
capital requirements, refining and expanding the risk-weighted 
method with the inclusion of new and adjusted parameters for various 
risk-exposures and a menu of three methodologies that banks could 
employ to determine their regulatory capital. Under the basic 
methodology, drawn from Basel I and referred to as “standardized 
approach,” Basel II has statutorily prescribed the risk-weight 
parameters to calculate capital charges in accordance to the riskiness 
of various operations. 80  With the introduction of two additional 
Internal Rating-Based (“IRB”) methodologies, 81  banks have been 
allowed, upon regulatory approval, to adopt their own models to 
adjust the risk-weighted coefficients and ultimately benefit from 
lower capital charges. In other words, in an attempt to alleviate the 
costs of compliance and monitoring, the introduction of IRB 
methodologies has elevated the models used by the industry for the 
calculation of economic capital to legal standards for the computation 
of regulatory capital.82 
The use of internal models to determine regulatory capital was a 
novelty in banking regulation. Today, it represents a rather 
established regulatory technique adopted not only in financial 
regulation, known in the literature as “meta-regulation” or “enforced 
                                                                                                                       
78.  Id at 122. 
79. See BASEL II, supra note 12, at 6. Although in the European Union every bank 
operating in the single market was subjected to Basel II, in the United States, small banks were 
exempted and have been regulated under Basel I. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 605. 
80. For a comparison of the different risk-weightings set forth by Basel I and Basel II, 
see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 588-92 and 596-601; see also Kern Alexander, The 
Role of Capital in Supporting Financial Stability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 344 (Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015). 
81. The two methodologies are the Foundation Internal Rating-Based (F-IRB) and the 
Advanced Internal Rating-Based (A-IRB). The latter allows banks to determine most of the 
parameters of the formula to calculate capital charges. 
82. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: 
AN EXPLANATORY NOTE (2001) [hereinafter AN EXPLANATORY NOTE]. 
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self-regulation.” 83 Regulators, instead of prescribing how regulated 
entities should comply with regulatory principles, require regulated 
entities to, first, develop their own mechanisms for compliance and, 
second, to prove the effectiveness of such mechanisms to regulators. 
In the context of capital regulation, the reason for involving regulated 
institutions in the regulatory process is twofold. First, there is an 
inherent benefit in building upon the knowledge and the expertise of 
the banking industry, given that regulators necessarily rely on 
practices developed by regulated entities to devise effective 
regulatory action. Thus, rather than imposing prescriptive rules that 
may be inflexible, the possibility of developing internal models to 
meet capital requirements aims at increasing the responsibility of 
regulated banks by incentivizing them to develop processes that both 
fit within their internal organizational structures and ensure regulatory 
compliance. Second, the expected lower capital charges resulting 
from the adoption of their own models and estimations – provided 
that they are approved by regulators – should incentivize banks to 
strengthen their risk management practices, resulting in greater 
resilience.84 
                                                                                                                       
83. Self-enforced regulation has been approached as a technique that transcends the 
traditional dichotomy between self-regulation and prescriptive regulatory standards and has 
been defined as a form of “subcontracting regulatory functions to private actors.” IAN AYRES 
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION 
DEBATE 103 (1992). The sectors where meta regulatory approaches have been adopted for 
some time are many and include food and industrial safety as well and environmental 
protection and pollution control. See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-
Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003). For a critical assessment of meta-regulation in the context of 
international financial regulation, see Julia Black, Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ 
Techniques and the Financial Crisis, 75 MOD. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (2012) (also noting that the 
arguments in support of meta-regulation are grounded on the idea that it enables firms to 
embed compliance mechanisms within their organisational structure, placing on them the 
responsibility to demonstrate compliance, rather than requiring regulators to demonstrate lack 
of compliance). In general, also after the recent financial crises, meta-regulatory techniques are 
widely used to define the system of corporate governance and control of banks. See generally 
IRIS HY CHIU, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL 
CONTROL IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2015). 
84 . See AN EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 82. Professor Black noted that meta-
regulation relies on regulated institutions having an appropriate culture of compliance and a 
correct set of incentives to pursue simultaneously public interest and private objectives. In a 
similar vein, regulatory authorities should have adequate skills to assess firms as well as 
“sufficient courage and political support to challenge them.” See Black supra note 83, at 1046. 
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The introduction of Basel II was controversial and, as the 2007-
2008 crisis unfolded, the Accord proved to harbor deep conceptual 
and operational flaws. A series of issues also emerged with respect to 
the reliance on internal models to calculate regulatory capital. 
Although large banks welcomed with favor the introduction of the 
internal model approach, the financial crisis revealed a series of 
weaknesses. First, there was the suspicion that banks could 
manipulate the IRB variants to benefit from lower charges without 
effectively curbing risks. 85  Second, the quality of internal data 
appeared questionable, given that the limited timeframe considered 
was inadequate to reflect systemic shocks which, by construction, 
were considered extremely unlikely.86 Third, the adoption of the IRB 
methodologies was not homogenous and similar operations 
corresponded to very different risk assessments and, thus, capital 
requirements. Finally, only largest banks fully benefited from capital 
reliefs associated with adoption of the most sophisticated IRB variant, 
i.e. the Advanced IRB, to calculate risk-weights for corporate 
exposures. 87  Instead, for corporate lending, banks tend to rely on 
parameters and models offered by regulators. These observations are 
not surprising: time is required to gather reliable datasets, develop 
stochastic analyses as well as to implement and fine-tune new 
governance approaches that have been re-defining the relationship 
between regulatory authorities and regulated entities.88 
To address (at least partially) the concerns with Basel II, the 
Basel Committee initiated a process of reforms that, following 
                                                                                                                       
85. Alexander, supra note 80, at 346. 
86. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 601 (indicating also the IRB approaches are not 
tailored to reflect the differences in national laws). More generally financial economists have 
noted that the models prescribed by Basel II are flawed. Jon Danielsson, Blame the Models, 4 J. 
FIN. STABILITY 321, 326 (2008) (noting that the focus on small and frequent events to 
construct models to calculate capital charges leads to unrealistic assumptions over the 
likelihood and the impact of larger losses). 
87. Given the ability of IRBs to significantly reduce capital charges, their adoption is 
expected to increase in the European Union. See EUR. BANKING AUTH. (EBA), INTERIM 
RESULTS UPDATE OF THE EBA REVIEW OF THE CONSISTENCY OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS 
(2013). Whereas, in the United States, the adoption of IRB approaches is considered less 
permissive. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 606. 
88. On the benefits and limits of internal models, see Robert F. Weber, New Governance, 
Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models 
Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, ADMINISTRATIVE L.R. 783, 860 (2010) (noting 
that for regulators the use of internal models is a tool to bridge the information asymmetry 
between banks and regulators). 
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extensive negotiations, resulted in the adoption of Basel III. 89 The 
necessity of a new accord to replace Basel II became evident with the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. Nonetheless, the adoption of Basel III 
occurred into two phases. Hence, certain elements of Basel III, 
primarily concerned with the level and the quality of regulatory 
capital, were adopted in 2011 and implemented starting from January 
2013. The remaining elements were adopted in 2017, and they will 
progressively enter into force starting from 2022 with a full 
implementation scheduled in 2027.90 It follows that the dawn is still 
not an imminent event for Basel II. Moreover, Basel II, together with 
the changes introduced in 2011, constitutes the Basel framework that 
is currently in force in several jurisdictions, including across the 
European Union.91  
 The long gestation required to finalize Basel III and the 
prolonged implementation period signal the existence of contraposed 
interests. Notably, these were represented, on the one hand, by the 
necessity of limiting the use of internal models and, on the other hand, 
by the compliance costs that sudden limitations to the use of internal 
models would have had on banks relying on them.92 Hence, different 
approaches have been developed, first, at the national level and, then, 
at the international level with the final adoption of Basel III.  
Limitations to the use of internal models have been, at first, 
introduced at the national level. In particular, the powers of national 
regulators to challenge the statistical models proposed by banks have 
been strengthened and regulators may impose more stringent criteria 
to ensure the reliability of banks’ own estimations. Further limitations 
                                                                                                                       
89.  See supra note 13. 
90.  See supra notes 13 & 23 and accompanying texts. 
91 . Moreover, BASEL II is poised to be relevant for several years to come. The 
implementation of the new Accord is likely to occur first in developed economies, whereas the 
timing for phasing out Basel II – and Basel I – in the rest of the world remains uncertain.  
92. See supra note 23. Considering that in the European Union every bank is subject to 
the Basel Accords and that the adoption of IRB approaches is common among large European 
banks, authorities from EU Member States were reluctant to accept limitations to the use of 
internal models put forward by Basel III. Such limitations, in fact, are likely to result in an 
increase of  regulatory capital for European banks. Differently, in the United States, limitations 
to the use of IRB approaches for large banks are already in place and small banks still rely on a 
version of Basel I to compute capital requirements. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 
605. Through these lenses, it is possible to understand that the stall in the negotiations 
concerning the completion of BASEL III (see supra note 15) was resolved also through the 
concession of a long implementation period. 
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are evident in the parameters adopted by national authorities to 
calculate capital charges for loans secured with real property. For 
instance, the Bank of England proposed more stringent parameters to 
calculate the risk-weight of residential mortgages under the IRB 
methodologies. 93  Such a trend reflects shared regulatory concerns 
over the dynamics leading to the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, 
originated in the mortgage market. More generally, the use of internal 
models has been typically limited through two techniques. The first 
one consists in the establishment of floors, below which the IRB 
approaches cannot reduce capital charges. 94 As a result, the use of 
own estimations is constrained within parameters that are statutorily 
established for different operations. The second technique commonly 
used is termed “slotting” and consists of classifying financing 
operations into buckets, or slots, with varying risk weights. 95 
Depending on a series of mandatory criteria, banks are required to 
categorize each operation within a corresponding slot in order to 
calculate capital charges. Both techniques are featured in the final 
version of Basel III.96  
Although Basel III is built upon the structure introduced by 
Basel II, thus maintaining the three-pillar structure and the possibility 
to use internal models, the new Accord introduces a number of 
significant changes. Since its inception, Basel III has been 
characterized by a pronounced emphasis on the overall stability of the 
banking system with attention towards the interconnectedness of 
banks, the levels of liquidity and leverage, as well as the quality of 
                                                                                                                       
93. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., BANK OF ENG., CONSULTATION PAPER: 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE RISK WEIGHTS 5 (2016), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/consultation-paper/2016/cp2916.pdf?la=en&hash=6EA
CFA5B459ECB1FB8D06991F4C18E0DE66F33D4 [https://perma.cc/WH9Q-Y84P] (archived 
Mar. 3, 2018). A similar approach has been followed by the Swedish Banking Supervisor 
(Finansinspektionen) in a memorandum expressly referred to the inability of internal risk 
models to capture (adequately) the risk related to mortgages, posing concerns for the stability 
of the Swedish market. See FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH. (Finansinspektionen), MEMORANDUM: 
RISK WEIGHT FLOOR FOR SWEDISH MORTGAGES 1 (2013), http://www.fi.se/contentassets/
f1de28204ca048d1a780ca4d230fae1d/riskviktsgolv-svenska-bolan-12-11920-21maj2014-
eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5H4-Z3LM] (archived Mar. 3, 2018).  
94. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 5, at 304. 
95. See IRB CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, at 2.  
96. For instance, see BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 38 (requiring banks that do not meet 
certain criteria to categorize their internal risk grades into five supervisory slots which specific 
risk weights). See also BASEL III, supra note 13, e.g., ¶ 147 (establishing a general twenty 
percent floor for collateralized transactions). 
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regulatory capital to limit excessive risk-taking.97 With its finalization, 
the risk-sensitivity of the standardized approach to calculate credit 
risk and operational risk has been improved with the introduction of 
more uniform criteria and further granularity among classes of 
borrowers and categories of operations.98 Moreover, the risk-weighted 
capital ratio has been accompanied by a reinforced leverage ratio, 
sustained by new capital floors applicable regardless of the 
methodology adopted.99 These revisions have the practical effect of 
bringing the standardized and the IRB approaches closer to one 
another. The intent is, in fact, twofold and consists of increasing the 
flexibility in the calculation of capital charges while limiting 
methodological discrepancies across jurisdictions and among banks. 
Notwithstanding the amplitude and the depth of these changes, 
when it comes to personal property collateral, Basel III does not 
present any significant variations from the general framework 
established in Basel II. If anything, the stronger emphasis on liquidity 
that permeates Basel III reinforces the regulatory skepticism, further 
illustrated below, 100  towards any collateral that is considered not 
sufficiently liquid and prone to depreciation in case of economic 
                                                                                                                       
97. This is evident already from the changes introduced in 2011. See 
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 5, at 608-609; and Alexander, supra note 76, at 349. For a 
summary of the main changes introduced by Basel III, see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS (2017) https://www.bis.org
/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5KH-KYL2] (archived Mar. 3, 2018) 
[hereinafter BASEL III HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY]. 
98. For instance, the standardized approach of Basel II assigned a flat risk weight that 
was equal for every residential mortgage. Under the standardized approach put forward in 
Basel III, the risk-weightings for mortgages depend on the loan-to-value ratio of the mortgage, 
that is the amount of the loan divided by the value of the property; see BASEL III, supra note 
13 ¶ 62. Moreover, a new risk-weighting has been introduced for exposures to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 43. In regard to operational risk, higher 
capital requirements apply to larger banks, as it is assumed that operational risk increases with 
a bank’s income, and to banks that have experienced greater losses due to operational failures, 
as they are considered more likely to suffer similar losses in the future. See BASEL III HIGH-
LEVEL SUMMARY supra note 97, 8. 
99. The refined leverage ratio targets, in particular, systemically important banks that 
would have to ensure at any point in time a minimum level of equity, in addition to the risk-
weighted capital ratio; see BASEL III, supra note 13, 140. In respect to the new output floor see 
BASEL III HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY supra note 97, 11. 
100. In this Article reference to BASEL III is made only where relevant for comparative 
purposes, given that Basel II is still the current set of standards for capital requirements and 
that Basel III did not modify substantially the regime governing the treatment of personal 
property as collateral.  
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downturns. EU regulators and Member State authorities, following 
this trend, have substantially conformed to the Basel framework 
without prescribing any variation for the risk-weight parameters for 
transactions secured with personal property.101 
2. The Rationale for Capital Requirements: Regulating Risk 
Given that the Basel framework is crisis-driven, its rationale 
should be interpreted in the light of the core concerns that emerged 
from the global financial crisis, whereby banks – notwithstanding 
formal compliance with capital standards – experienced liquidity 
issues.102 The risk of a collapse of the entire financial system, together 
with multiple regulatory failures in addressing that occurrence, 
prompted national and international regulators to take a broader look 
at the dynamics of financial markets and to reassess the appropriate 
regulatory strategies to preserve financial stability. 103  In banking 
regulation, the stance for more direct action to curb the risk of a 
systemic failure entails a more careful balance between the traditional 
micro-prudential focus, inherent in the Basel Accords, and macro-
prudential regulatory tools, aimed at ensuring the stability of the 
banking system as a whole. 104  An effective illustration of the 
difference between these two regulatory functions is offered by a 
recurring metaphor according to which micro-prudential regulation is 
                                                                                                                       
101. With regard to the United Kingdom, regardless of terms defining its departure from 
the European Union, there is no indication that national regulators will not apply the provision 
enshrined in EU law, at least in the context of the risk-weight approach for loans secured 
through movable assets. In general, a disapplication of EU regulation may have direct 
consequences on the ability of British banking institutions to operate in the single market. For 
an analysis of the impact of various “Brexit” options on the financial service industry in the 
United Kingdom, see John Armour, Brexit and Financial Services 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POLICY S54 (2017). See also Niamh Moloney, Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit: An 
Uncertain Future for The City? 17 GERMAN L.J. 75 (2016). 
102. BASEL III (2011), supra note 13, ¶ 35. 
103. See generally FIN. SERVICES AUTH. (FSA), THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009); EU COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE HIGH 
LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU CHAIRED BY JACQUES DE LAROISIERE 
(2009). On the failures of various regulatory strategies, including those incentivizing the use of 
internal models, see Black, supra note 83, at 1037. 
104. Several assessments have been made to identify critical regulatory failures that 
emerged during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. For an elevated perspective on the regulatory 
governance issues, see Black supra note 83. For a political economy perspective, see WHAT 
HAVE WE LEARNED? MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS (George Akerlof et al. 
eds., 2014). 
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concerned with the health of the trees (individual banks) and macro-
prudential regulation is the safeguard of the forest (the banking 
system as a whole).105 
In practical terms, micro and macro-prudential regulatory 
strategies may differ significantly. The former focuses primarily on 
“idiosyncratic risk,” which is the risk related to any specific operation. 
Given that idiosyncratic risks are, by definition, uncorrelated with one 
another and show little correlation with market risk, under a micro-
prudential approach capital requirements curb individual risk-
exposures chiefly through diversification strategies. In contrast, under 
a macro-prudential approach, capital requirements are designed to 
address more directly the correlation among various risk-exposures. 
In particular, they are concerned with the mitigation of “systemic risk,” 
which is the likelihood that an event affecting one or more financial 
entities triggers financial instability. 106  The cyclical movements of 
markets and economies, the occurrence of diffused shocks and the 
failure of interconnected banks undermine risk-management strategies 
based on diversification. For instance, granting credit to a small 
                                                                                                                       
105. Rosa Maria Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and Financial Stability, 6 CAPITAL 
MARKETS L.J. 197, 198 (2011) (focusing on the need for a special regime to resolve 
systemically relevant financial institutions, of SIFIs). For an early analysis indicating the 
necessity of combining micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulatory tools, see Andrew D. 
Crockett, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements, Remarks at the Eleventh 
International Conference of Banking Supervisors: Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential 
Dimensions of Financial Stability (Basel, Sept. 20-21, 2000). 
106. Systemic risk is a multifaceted concept that, like its positive counterpart “financial 
stability,” has blurred contours. A joint report issued by the International Monetary Fund, the 
Bank for International Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board sets a commonly 
accepted definition indicating a systemic event as “the disruption to the flow of financial 
services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has 
the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.” INT’L MONETARY 
FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS–BACKGROUND 
PAPER 5-6 (2009). Professor Steven Schwarcz indicated that systemic risk should be 
understood as a specific type of tragedy of the commons that occurs because market 
participants are not incentivized to limit individual risk-taking, notwithstanding the potential 
negative consequences on markets. Therefore, regulatory intervention is necessary and should 
be tailored to redress the incentive structure of financial institutions. See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193 (2008). For an account of the primary issues related to 
systemic risk in the banking sector, see Olivier de Bandt et al., Philipp Hartmann & José L. 
Peydró, Systemic Risk in Banking After the Great Financial Crisis, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BANKING (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson eds., 2014). 
On regulating systemic risk in capital markets, see Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to 
Securities Regulation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 941 (2010). 
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business is a routine financing operation that presents a high level of 
idiosyncratic risk and a low level of systemic risk. The related credit 
risk is mitigated in a portfolio containing other (less risky) loans; thus 
the probability of non-repayment is higher than the probability that a 
default on that loan could generate a systemic shock. Yet, a phase of 
economic recession that simultaneously constrains the ability of a 
large portion of small businesses to repay their loans when due would 
impair the ability of the lender to meet its short-term obligations. 
Depending on the economic contingencies, a lack of sufficient 
liquidity may then ramify into systemic concerns. This sketch 
illustrates that the mitigation of credit risk may not alone curb the risk 
of banking or systemic failures. Given the maturity mismatch between 
short-term liabilities and long-term investments, a bank may become 
insolvent due to insufficient liquidity. Hence, the Basel framework is 
particularly concerned with the maintenance of sufficient levels of 
liquidity of individual banks as well as within the entire banking 
system. 
The pivot of the risk-based approach of the Basel framework is 
represented by the coefficients to weigh capital charges against the 
levels of risks, in particular credit risk, associated with lending 
operations. Under the standardized approach, risk-weighted 
coefficients are defined by regulators and the possibility of 
considering factors mitigating credit risk is limited. For instance, 
small business loans are risk-weighted at seventy-five percent,107 and 
only security rights over highly liquid assets, such as bank accounts, 
may be considered to reduce credit risk and thus capital charges. 
Risk-weight coefficients feed into the capital adequacy formula and, 
assuming there are no other risk factors or surcharges, capital charges 
are calculated by multiplying: (1) the loaned amount, by (2) the risk-
weight, by (3) eight percent. By way of example, a small business 
loan with a value of 100 requires a bank to hold capital equal to or 
greater than six. 
Risk-weighted coefficients can be considered legal constructions 
that resemble statutory presumptions expressed in percentage terms of 
                                                                                                                       
107. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 69. Basel III has introduced a new risk weight for 
exposures to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Hence, when the new rules will 
enter into force, exposures to SMEs could either be subject to a treatment similar to the one 
currently in place, thus receiving a risk weight of seventy-five percent or, if not eligible, they 
could still receive a eighty-five percent risk-weighting. 
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both the likelihood of repayment and the level of liquidity for 
different classes of financing operations and borrowers. The adoption 
of the IRB variants allows banks to adjust such a presumption. Under 
the IRBs, banks may determine the parameters for the calculation of 
capital charges by resorting to internal estimations over the 
probability of default and the resulting losses. The risks associated 
with a specific lending operation may be further mitigated, taking into 
account specific factors, such as the protection offered by a security 
right over tangible assets or receivables. However, in spite of their 
name, IRBs are governed by stringent regulatory prescriptions, 
according to which a security right in collateral may lead to reduced 
capital charges only if banks comply with specific regulatory 
requirements, as further examined in the next Section of this Article. 
Even more, as illustrated earlier, the finalization of Basel III has 
further constrained the use of IRBs.108 
From the above it emerges that the tension between secured 
transactions law and prudential regulation has profound roots. 
Secured transactions law aims at facilitating credit creation through 
private negotiations and under the assumption that credit risk is 
mitigated whenever security rights over collateral are taken. In this 
regard, secured transactions law, by focusing on the transactional 
dimension of security rights, is not concerned with systemic 
considerations nor does it delve into the connection between credit 
and liquidity risk. Prudential regulation is a crisis-driven, 
internationally-led regulatory framework designed to prevent banking 
failures and preserve the stability of the entire financial system. 
Stemming from this general rationale, capital requirements follow an 
operational logic that regulates banks from “within” in order to limit 
the level of risk taken by a particular bank as well as the risk 
accumulated in the entire banking system. Upon these premises, 
dissonances are expected when the rules governing security rights 
encounter the legal presumptions and the regulatory parameters 
established to compute capital charges; that is when the secured 
creditor is a regulated credit institution. 
                                                                                                                       
108.   See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.  
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III. DISSONANCES BETWEEN SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW 
AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 
While any security instrument can be understood as a device to 
manage credit risk,109 different rules on creation, perfection, priority, 
and enforcement impact the credit protection effectively offered by 
each instrument. The legal treatment of a security right depends on 
either its legal nature, under legal regimes embracing a formalist 
approach, such as English law,110 or its economic effects, under legal 
regimes that follow functionalism as the ordering principle, including 
those defined by UNCITRAL reflecting the North American 
experience. 111  In legal systems deploying formalism, in which 
multiple categories of security rights coexist, the legal 
characterization of a security instrument is to be ascertained in order 
to determine the requirements for its creation, perfection, priority, and 
enforcement. By and large, the prudential regulatory framework 
neglects the granularity of national laws, focusing instead on specific 
legal and economic effects of a security right. Security instruments, 
together with other contractual mechanisms, are defined as Credit-
Risk Mitigation (“CRM”) techniques. 112  CRMs are primarily 
designed to lessen the risks associated with individual financing 
operations and, overall, with the entire portfolio of financing 
operations of a bank. When CRM techniques are employed, the 
resulting risk-weighted capital charge should not be higher than that 
imposed on otherwise identical transactions that are not covered by 
credit protections. 113  However, if providing inadequate credit 
                                                                                                                       
109. Castellano, supra note 27, at 617 (indicating that “the primary economic function of 
non-possessory secured transactions is to manage and mitigate credit risk without limiting the 
production capacity of the collateral and the debtor.”). 
110. A formalist approach is adopted in various European jurisdictions e.g., France and 
Italy, where multiple categories of security rights coexist and are statutorily defined. On the 
formalist approach, see GOODE, supra note 3, ¶ 1-04. 
111. For a critical assessment of functionalism and formalism in secured transactions 
laws, see Michael G. Bridge et al., Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding the Law of 
Secured Transactions, 44 MCGILL L.J. 567 (1999). 
112. CRMs are defined as techniques whereby “exposures may be collateralized by first 
priority claims, in whole or in part with cash or securities, a loan exposure may be guaranteed 
by a third party, or a bank may buy a credit derivative to offset various forms of credit risk.” 
BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 109; also restated in BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 117. 
113. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 113. This principle is a mainstay for CRM and has been 
restated in SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 104 and ultimately codified 
also in BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 119. 
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protection, for instance, due to insufficient value of the collateral, 
security instruments may result in capital charges that correspond to 
those applied to unsecured credit. 114  In such circumstances, even 
though the security instrument could still be taken into account for the 
purpose of calculating banks’ economic capital, capital requirements 
effectively increase. 
From the foregoing discussion, it becomes apparent that the 
traditional narrative advocating that the use of collateral broadens 
access to credit by reducing its cost does not stand on firm ground. 
The sole existence of a security right over an asset, even though 
reducing credit risk, does not result per se in a reduced capital charge. 
In fact, while collateralized transactions are intended to offer credit 
protection, they also generate new risks, including legal risk, 
hindering the exercise of secured creditors’ rights; operational risk, 
arising from faulty procedures to monitor or evaluate collateral; and 
liquidity risk, arising from the difficulties in the disposal of 
collateral.115 A security right reduces a capital charge below the level 
of that applicable to unsecured loans only if it complies with 
prescriptive regulatory requirements ensuring the soundness of 
individual banks and the stability of the entire banking system. Thus, 
it is key to elicit such requirements. 
Under the Basel framework, to determine whether a given CRM 
technique corresponds to reduced capital charges, banks have to 
deploy specific procedures articulated either in the standardized 
approach or, if authorized by national regulators, in one of the two 
IRB variants. Subsequently, depending on the methodology adopted, 
various provisions apply to determine if a given type of transaction 
constitutes an eligible credit protection and its corresponding 
coefficient for the computation of the risk-weighted capital charge.116 
                                                                                                                       
114. There are some exceptions to this rule and in some instances non-eligible CRMs 
may also result in lower capital charges, as it occurs in the case of past due loans. See BASEL II, 
supra note 12, ¶ 77. Nonetheless, Basel III adopts a more conservative approach and only 
collateral and guarantees considered eligible for CRM purposes may be taken into account to 
lower capital charges. See BASEL III, supra note 13, ¶ 94. In any respect, the application of 
these exceptions does not affect the regulatory treatment of security rights here examined.  
115. BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 115 and BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 122. 
116. This may occur in different fashions. In general, if a coefficient is not statutorily 
attributed to a specific operation, the risk-weight of the collateralized transaction results from 
the reduced exposure calculated after the CRM, multiplied by the risk-weight of the 
counterparty; BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 148 and BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 162. 
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In this context, the regulatory treatment of security rights over 
financial assets, receivables and tangible goods is examined and the 
implication of the lack of coordination between secured transactions 
law and capital requirements is unveiled. 
A. The Regulatory Treatment of Secured Transactions 
The rationale and the inner logic of capital requirements are 
embedded in the requisites for eligible credit protections enshrined in 
the Basel framework and implemented in the EU by the Capital 
Requirements Directive (“CRD IV”) and the CRR.117 The CRD IV 
and the CRR are essential components of the European Single Rule 
Book and apply to any bank operating in the European single market, 
extending to the European Economic Area. These two texts of EU 
secondary legislation – and, in particular, the CRR for the purpose of 
determining capital requirements – recurrently entrust the European 
Banking Authority (“EBA”) with the tasks of defining guidelines and 
drafting technical standards.118 The latter are then to be adopted by 
the European Commission through delegated or implementing acts, 
pursuant to relevant Treaty provisions and procedures. 119  The 
resulting level of legal harmonization substantially limits national 
discretion and offers grounds for a more accurate analysis of the 
regulatory treatment, under different methodologies, of the most 
common types of collateralized transactions. 
                                                                                                                       
117. CRD IV, supra note 14; CRR, supra note 14. 
118. In particular, the EBA, like the other European Supervisory Authorities, may draft 
Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical Standards. See arts. 10 & 15 of 
Council Regulation 1093/2010, Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. L. 331/12. 
119. Notably under arts. 290 & 291 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (c. 326) [hereinafter TFEU]. On 
the regulatory powers of the EBA, see Paul Craig, Comitology, Rulemaking and the Lisbon 
Settlement: Tensions and Strains, in RULEMAKING BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE 
NEW SYSTEM FOR DELEGATION OF POWERS 195 (Carl F. Bergström and Dominique Ritleng 
eds., 2016). On the legal basis and powers of the European Supervisory Authorities, see Niamh 
Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1609 (2014); Elaine Fahey, Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? 
Reflections on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority, 74 MOD. L. REV. 581 
(2011). 
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The CRR identifies two requisites for CRMs to mitigate credit 
risk and thus discount capital charges. 120  First, assets have to be 
included in the list of “eligible collateral” contained in the CRR.121 
Second, they have to be “sufficiently liquid” with a stable value over 
time.122 Moreover, banks should demonstrate – through written and 
independent legal opinions – that they have the right to liquidate (or 
retain) the collateral promptly in the event of the debtor’s default or 
insolvency in all relevant jurisdictions.123 The intent of these general 
provisions is to ensure that lower capital charges correspond to lower 
levels of credit and liquidity risk by focusing on the effective 
realization of the value of the collateral. The legal certainty and the 
enforceability of a security right are of paramount importance in this 
context. These principles permeate the bulk of provisions concerning 
different classes of collateral and types of transactions, and ultimately 
design a regulatory framework that privileges security rights on liquid 
assets, such as financial instruments, over less liquid tangible assets. 
Upon these premises, Article 197 of the CRR contains a list of 
eligible collateral, such as gold, cash and financial instruments 
deposited in accounts held by the lending institution extending the 
secured loan. 124  In addition, cash on deposit or assimilated 
instruments that are “held by a third party institution in a non-
custodial arrangement and pledged to the lending institution” may 
constitute eligible collateral.125 In taking this asset-specific approach, 
these provisions of the CRR do not take into account the practice of 
                                                                                                                       
120. The regulatory framework for CRMs is contained in BASEL II and their treatment is 
specified for each methodology. The framework is currently under revision following the 
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23. The CRR already contains some of the 
proposed changes. 
121. CRR, supra note 14, art. 194(3)(a). 
122. Id., art. 194(3)(b). 
123. Id., arts. 194(1) & (4). 
124. The list also includes a variety of equity and debt finance instruments, issued by 
governments and institutions rated by credit rating agencies authorized under EU law, listed in 
recognized stock-exchanges, or that qualify as senior debts. See CRR, supra note 14, art. 197. 
The blueprint of this list is put forward in BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 145-146. The CRR 
already encapsulates the proposed amendments advanced by the Basel Committee in the 
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 132 and now codified in BASEL III, 
supra note 13 ¶ 148. 
125. CRR, supra note 14, art. 200(a). CRR arts. 200(b) & (c), also provides that “life 
insurance policies pledged to the lending institution” and “instruments issued by third party 
institutions which will be repurchased by that institution on request” may be used as eligible 
collateral. 
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taking a security right over the entire business, which is common in 
English law (under floating charges) and contemplated by the EBRD 
Model Law in the form of an enterprise charge. The ability to 
evaluate, control and promptly convert collateralized assets into cash 
is a common feature of the listed assets. Hence, lending operations 
backed by these assets allow the curbing of credit risk while 
maintaining a sufficient level of liquidity, given that the repayment of 
a loan is protected by assets that are either equivalent to or promptly 
convertible into cash.126 Moreover, some of these assets may be re-
pledged by the secured creditor to secure its own borrowing, giving it 
an additional source of liquidity.127 It follows that, when a security 
right in these assets is established, a reduced capital charge is justified 
from a (micro and macro) prudential perspective. In the EU, these 
assets partially overlap with the legal category of “financial collateral” 
set forth in the FCD.128 In this respect, the FCD, by limiting legal 
formalities to establish and transfer financial collateral and by 
facilitating swift and efficient enforcement mechanisms in case of a 
debtor’s default or insolvency, 129  dovetails with the CRR and 
contributes to preserving financial stability through the maintenance 
of sufficient levels of liquidity in financial markets. 
Security rights over tangible assets and receivables may be 
considered in the computation of risk-weighted capital charges only 
under the IRB methodologies. Such an approach has been introduced 
                                                                                                                       
126. In line with BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 145-146, the CRR defines a detailed set of 
approaches and methodologies to compute the impact of different forms of financial collateral 
on capital requirements. CRR art. 222 defines the “financial collateral simple method” to 
calculate capital requirements under the standardized approach; whereas CRR art. 223 sets out 
the “financial collateral comprehensive method” to be used under different methodologies. The 
list of eligible collateral considered here and contained in CRR art. 197 applies to all methods 
and approaches. 
127. FCD, supra note 36, art. 5(1). On the right of the secured creditor to use financial 
collateral under FCD, see GEOFFREY YEOWART & ROBIN PARSONS, YEOWART AND PARSONS 
ON THE LAW OF FINANCIAL COLLATERAL ch. 11 (2016). 
128. FCD, supra note 36, art. 1, ¶ 4(a), defines financial collateral as cash, financial 
instruments or credit claims. In the CRR, the treatment of financial collateral as credit 
protection is further specified under art. 207. However, the CRR is not limited to credit claims 
but recognizes a defined broader category of receivables (art. 199), further regulated under art. 
209. On financial collateral, see HUGH BEALE ET AL., supra note 2, ¶¶ 3.01ff. 
129. FCD, supra note 36, arts. 4 & 8. The FCD recognizes two fundamental remedies 
that may be exercised against financial collateral, namely the power of sale and appropriation, 
the former being most commonly used. See YEOWART & ROBIN PARSONS, supra note 127, ¶¶ 
4-01 & 12-06. 
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with Basel II and it remained almost unaffected with the adoption of 
the final version of Basel III. The CRR establishes a series of detailed 
provisions that are regrouped here into two sets of requirements. The 
first set of requirements, enumerated in Article 209(3) of the CRR, 
defines the risk management procedures that banks must deploy in 
order to benefit from reduced capital charges.130 Banks must conduct 
a regular assessment of the credit risk associated with receivables, 
including an evaluation of the credit practices adopted by the 
debtor.131 They must ensure that the difference between the amount of 
the exposure and the value of the receivables reflects the costs of 
enforcement and the risk associated with their concentration in the 
bank’s overall portfolio.132 Encumbered receivables should also have 
a limited correlation with the solvency of the debtor.133 Moreover, 
certain forms of receivables, due to their nature, are simply 
considered ineligible for CRM purposes.134 
For security rights over tangible assets, termed “physical 
collateral,”135 the first set of requirements also relates to the ability of 
banks to manage the risks arising from their deployment with a 
particular emphasis on liquidity risk. Regulators are concerned with 
the processes that banks use to assess the value of given physical 
collateral in relation to the secondary market in which they can be 
liquidated.136 Publicly available data on market prices, estimations of 
expected time and costs needed to dispose of the asset are required to 
both prove the existence of a sufficiently liquid market and assess the 
                                                                                                                       
130. The CRR provision mirrors BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 516-520. The provisions 
have been maintained in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 290-294. 
131. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(a). 
132. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(b). 
133. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(3)(c). 
134. These include receivables connected with securitizations, sub-participations and 
credit derivatives, and receivables from affiliates of the borrower, such as subsidiaries and 
employees. See CRR, supra note 14, arts. 199(5) & 209(3)(d). 
135. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(1)(c). 
136. These principles are also contained in BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶¶ 521 & 522. In 
this regard, BASEL III largely retains these core requisites, with a relevant difference: national 
regulators lost the discretionary power to compile a list of collateral that are automatically 
considered to meet the market conditions to be treated as eligible collateral. See BASEL III, 
supra note 13, ¶¶ 295 & 296. This change, although it reflects the efforts of the Basel 
Committee to reduce national discrepancies, represents a further barrier to the use of personal 
property as collateral. 
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amount that is expected to be recovered.137 Although delegated acts 
may identify the types of physical collateral for which market and 
value conditions can be considered automatically met, 138 the EBA 
communicated that there are no types of collateral for which these 
conditions could be assumed, requiring banks to conduct case-by-case 
evaluations.139 Furthermore, banks are also required to demonstrate 
that they have procedures to monitor regularly and objectively any 
change in the value of the collateral.140 As a further protection, the 
collateral must be insured against the risk of damage. 141  These 
prescriptions lie outside the scope of secured transactions law. 
However, compliance with these requirements alone corners the 
parties’ autonomy, notably by limiting the level of risk banks may 
take if the security instrument is to reduce capital charges. As a result, 
banks may be dis-incentivized to enter into secured transactions or 
they may do so at a higher cost. 
The second set of requirements relates more directly to the 
features of the law governing secured transactions. In line with the 
necessity of ensuring effective credit protection, banks should assess 
and demonstrate, by means of independent legal opinions, the legal 
certainty of their rights over receivables and physical collateral.142 
Specifically, the regulatory framework focuses on three central 
aspects, i.e. perfection, priority and enforceability in case of default. 
To provide eligible credit protection, a security right over these types 
of collateral (and the claim to proceeds deriving from their 
liquidation) should have priority over all competing claimants with 
the exception of statutory claims identified in national laws.143 From 
                                                                                                                       
137. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(6). Moreover, CRR art. 199(6)(d) provides that a bank 
should demonstrate “that the realised proceeds from the collateral are not below 70 per cent of 
the collateral value in more than 10 per cent of all liquidations for a given type of collateral.” 
This evidences the attention to the value of the collateral, which is determined in relation to 
market analyses. 
138. CRR, supra note 14, art. 199(8). 
139. See Rules and Guidance, EUR. BANKING AUTH., Rules and Guidance,  
www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/rules-and-guidance 
[https://perma.cc/6VDT-E4CC] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).  
140. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 210(c) & (g). 
141. Id. art. 208(5). 
142. Id. arts. 209(2)(c) & 210(a). 
143. Id. arts. 209(2)(b) & 210(b). BASEL II, supra note 12, refers to the necessity of 
having first priority on collateralized transactions (in general) at ¶ 513, and on physical 
collateral at ¶ 522. The same requisites are indicated in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶¶ 287 & 296. 
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the combined examination of the provisions defining the eligibility 
requisites for receivables and physical collateral, it emerges that a 
secured transactions regime should enable banks to enforce a security 
right swiftly. These general requirements set the guidelines for 
detailed rules that define narrow contours for a collateralized 
transaction to qualify as eligible credit protection and result in a 
reduced capital charge. 
B. The Interactions between Secured Transactions Law and Capital 
Requirements 
Capital requirements, in defining the requisites for credit 
protection, delineate a specific regulatory understanding of security 
rights. Such an understanding is consistent in several aspects to the 
one advanced in modern secured transactions laws. However, a series 
of inconsistencies emerge regarding the execution of security 
agreements, the rights and obligations of the parties, and the 
enforcement and publicity regime of security rights. 
First, the CRR and the Basel framework require the security 
agreement to contain a detailed description of the physical 
collateral;144 thus implying that a detailed description is a proxy for 
exercising control. Such a requirement may be reasonable when the 
collateral is a discrete item of property, say, a piece of equipment, but 
could be rather cumbersome if the debtor is, for instance, a company 
that owns a variety of similar items. The assumption is that a detailed 
description would allow for a prompt identification of the collateral 
and its segregation from other assets that may either be unencumbered 
or subject to other security rights. Thus, theoretically, banks should 
enjoy greater control over physical collateral that can be readily 
identified and separated from other assets in the event of default. 
However, from a practical standpoint, a contractual formula 
identifying collateral as “all assets” or a description by type or 
category would achieve the same end in a more effective manner. 
Such descriptions, in fact, allow secured creditors to identify and take 
control of collateral upon default by circumventing the cost of a 
precise identification and expediting the enforcement of their right. It 
is for this reason that the UNCITRAL and EBRD Model Laws 
                                                                                                                       
144. CRR, supra note 14, art. 210(d) reflecting BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 522 and, now, 
contained in BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 287. 
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recognize that reference to “all assets” or to all movable assets within 
a category, suffices.145 Similarly, English common law, the Belgian 
Pledge Act and the new provisions regulating the non-possessory 
pledge in Italy only require encumbered assets to be sufficiently 
identified or identifiable. 146  Accordingly, the CRR embraces a 
position that is discordant with a trend promoted by international soft-
laws and embraced by national laws, in favor of an approach that 
considers encumbered assets in isolation, rather than considering 
them as part of a growing concern. In most cases, the sale of business 
as a whole would generate more value than an item-by-item disposal. 
The CRR effectively supplants national secured transactions law by 
establishing more stringent standards applicable to banks that seek to 
reduce capital charges. Nonetheless, such a position does not appear 
to be sustained by prudential concerns. If anything, a detailed 
description of the collateral, by inducing the parties to single out 
specific assets, limits the efficacy of such credit protections by 
increasing the costs of monitoring and enforcement, with a 
consequent surge in operational and legal risks. In contrast, generic 
descriptions allow banks to manage those risks more effectively. 
A second issue relates to the right granted to banks to conduct 
regular inspections of physical collateral.147 Secured transactions laws 
may specifically recognize such a right or may simply facilitate its 
exercise by leaving the definition of the manner in which inspections 
should be carried out to private negotiations. 148  Under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, a secured creditor may inspect the collateral, 
but defers to the parties agreement to determine what would constitute 
a reasonable time for inspection and whether a prior notice is 
                                                                                                                       
145. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 9; EBRD MODEL LAW, supra 
note 43, art. 5.5. Contrast with U.C.C. § 9-108(c), under which “super-generic” collateral 
descriptions, such as “all assets,” are not sufficient. See also HARRIS & MOONEY, supra note 
44, at 150. 
146. On English law, see GOODE, supra note 3, ¶ 2-05. In Belgium, see Belgian Pledge 
Act, supra note 29. In Italy, Italian Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 31, art. 1(2). 
147. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 210(g) & (h); BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 522 and BASEL 
III, supra note 13, ¶ 287. 
148. See EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 15.4.3 (imposing no limitations on the 
right of the secured creditor to inspect collateral in possession of the debtor). Similarly, under 
the new Belgian regime, the secured creditor may inspect the collateral at any time. Belgian 
Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 16. 
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required.149 Other than providing for a security agreement to include a 
right to conduct regular inspection, the Basel Accords and the CRR 
are silent on how banks can effectively exercise such a right. On the 
one hand, the absence of specific provisions may be explained as an 
attempt to both concede some freedom to the parties and provide 
more room for maneuver to national laws. On the other hand, the 
CRR does not appear particularly concerned with the parties’ freedom, 
nor is it conscious of the variety of legal solutions offered by national 
legal regimes. In fact, capital requirements, in different circumstances 
reflecting their operational logic, overrule party autonomy with 
detailed prescriptions regarding banks’ risk-management processes.150 
Therefore, reference to a right to inspect merely restates a general 
principle hosted in most legal systems without adding much to solve a 
debate on how this right could (or should) be exercised, or whether a 
requirement to inform the debtor prior to any inspection would impair 
the effectiveness of the credit protection. The lack of such a provision 
– within a detailed regulation that is zealously concerned with the 
mechanisms that ensure monitoring of the value of collateral – 
appears to fall short of an essential element expected for the prudent 
management of credit risk. 
The juxtaposition of the provisions enumerating the eligibility 
requisites for receivables and physical collateral reveals enforcement 
mechanisms as a third area of dissonance between secured 
transactions law and capital requirements. As a general principle, 
capital requirements establish that banks should be able to swiftly 
enforce their rights by retaining or liquidating collateral in the event 
of the financial distress or insolvency of the debtor.151 For financial 
collateral, the CRR conforms to the provisions contained in the FCD 
whereby the enforcement of a security right over these assets should 
not be subjected to formal requirements. 152  For security rights in 
receivables arising from commercial transactions, banks should have 
the right to dispose of them without needing the consent of the 
                                                                                                                       
149. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 55(2). A similar disposition is also 
contained in the DCFR ch. IX, § 5.201(2). 
150. See, e.g., supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
151. CRR, supra note 14, art. 194(4). 
152. FCD, supra note 36, art. 3. 
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receivables obligors. 153  If the contract generating a receivable 
contains a clause banning any assignment – and such clause is 
recognized by the applicable law, as is the case under the English 
common law – a bank would be prevented from taking a security right 
in that receivable.154 A rule that overrides the contractual freedom of 
the parties to restrict assignment has become ubiquitous in various 
secured transactions laws, including the UNCITRAL Model Law.155 
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Model Law allows the secured creditor 
to collect encumbered receivables even before default with the 
consent of the grantor.156 For security rights in physical collateral, the 
Basel Accords and the CRR require banks to ensure that the value of 
the collateral may be realized within a reasonable timeframe.157 The 
CRR does not prescribe any specific enforcement approach. Hence, as 
long as remedies are expeditious, whether through extra-judicial or 
judicial enforcement mechanisms or alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, they may satisfy the regulatory expectation for a 
security right to be realizable within a reasonable timeframe. This is 
in line with the position of the UNCITRAL Model Law that 
recognizes the importance of swift enforcement mechanisms. 158  In 
contrast, the EBRD Model Law imposes formalities that may delay 
                                                                                                                       
153. CRR, supra note 14, art. 209(2)(f); BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 520 and BASEL III, 
supra note 13 ¶ 294. For the purposes of UCC Article 9 and the Canadian PPSAs, receivables 
obligors would be equated with account debtors. 
154. For a cogent critique of the issues posed by these clauses, see Hugh Beale, Louise 
Gullifer & Sarah Paterson, A Case for Interfering with Freedom of Contract? An Empirically-
Informed Study of Bans on Assignments, 3 J. BUS. L. 203 (2016). Clauses restricting 
assignments may be in the nature of a complete bar or a limited restriction, to the effect that 
assignment can only be to companies in the same group as the assignor. See Michael Bridge, 
The Nature of Assignment and Non-Assignment Clauses, 132 L.Q.R 57 (2016). 
155. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 13; EBRD MODEL LAW, supra 
note 43, art. 5.4; DCFR ch. IX, § 2:104(2). All are not limited to receivables and provide that 
generally a security right may be created in an asset even if its owner has agreed not to transfer 
it. French and German laws also override contractual restrictions on assignments of 
receivables in commercial contracts. See Beale, Gullifer & Paterson, supra note 154, at 227. 
Belgian law similarly renders anti-assignment clauses ineffective against third parties. Belgian 
Pledge Act, supra note 30, art. 64. For Canada, see CUMING, WALSH & WOOD, supra note 3, 
at 113. Gilmore notes that even prior to the enactment of UCC 9, contract rights moved to 
being completely assignable at law. GILMORE, supra note 25, at 213. 
156. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 82. 
157. CRR, supra note 14, art. 210(a). 
158. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 73(2). Belgian law also recognizes 
the ability of the secured creditor to enforce its rights extra-judicially as long as it proceeds in 
a commercially reasonable manner. See Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 47. 
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the enforcement beyond a reasonable timeframe by requiring 
registration of an enforcement notice and by suspending the final 
disposal of the collateral for at least 60 days after delivery of the 
enforcement notice to the debtor.159 
Fourth, with respect to priority, capital requirements are 
trenchant and essentially associate reduced capital charges only to 
security rights with first priority.160 The Basel Accords and the CRR 
do not prescribe any specific mechanisms to achieve highest priority, 
probably in consideration of the disharmonious solutions offered at 
the national level.161 For instance, clear priority rules are commonly 
defined for security rights in the original collateral but they may be 
uncertain when the collateral is subsequently transferred, transformed 
or commingled. Due to the limited scope of application of the EBRD 
Model Law, the proceeds of collected receivables deposited in a bank 
account held with another financial institution have an uncertain 
priority status.162 Conversely, the UNCITRAL Model Law extends 
the priority status of a security right over receivables to their 
proceeds. 163 The clarity of priorities may be further clouded when 
preferential claims are not set forth in a manner that allows secured 
creditors to assess the hierarchical status of their claims. A secured 
transactions law that embraces the regulatory understanding of 
security rights as devices to mitigate credit risk should state any 
preferential claims affecting the priority of secured creditors. This is 
the position advanced by UNCITRAL.164 Such an approach appears 
to be a rarity, given that in most legal systems preferential claims are 
scattered in various legislative texts, often attesting to political 
considerations. This is evidenced by the diverse ranking of employees’ 
preferential rights across European legal systems.165 
                                                                                                                       
159. EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 43, arts. 33.1.6 & 24.1 (Supplementary 
Registration Statement) & art. 24.1 (Measures for Realisation of Charged Property). 
160. CRR, supra note 14, arts. 209(2)(b) & 210(b). 
161. See José M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes are the Same: The Distributional 
Question in International Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 459 (2011). 
162. The EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 43, art. 5.10, extends the priority of the charge 
only to proceeds of an insurance policy on the charged goods. 
163. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 32; see also DCFR ch. IX, §§ 4:104-
4:105. 
164. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 34. Neither the EBRD MODEL LAW 
nor the DCFR contain a similar provision. 
165. In the United Kingdom, expenses of the administrators and employees’ claims – 
together with the prescribed part for unsecured creditors – have priority over floating charges 
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A fifth issue that defines the concomitant application of these 
two branches of the law relates to filing requirements and its effects 
on security rights. Basel Accords and the CRR do not directly specify 
when a security right is perfected and what formalities should be met 
to consider a security instrument an eligible CRM.166 However, the 
EU regulatory framework governing “specialized lending” suggests a 
specific regulatory understanding of the function attributed to 
registration and filing requirements. Specialized lending comprises 
various financing operations to finance physical assets and for which 
the primary source of repayment is the income generated by those 
assets, including power plants, aircraft objects and various 
commodities inventories. 167  Without much consideration of the 
different national rules governing registration and perfection of non-
possessory security rights, the EBA specifies, “[a] lien is perfected by 
registering it with appropriate statutory authority so that it is made 
legally enforceable and any subsequent claim on that asset is given a 
junior status.” 168  Such a provision reflects common national and 
international secured transactions laws that impose registration as the 
only mechanism to perfect security rights in specific assets, like 
                                                                                                                       
but not over fixed charges. See Insolvency Act, supra note 53; Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 
(U.K.). In France, according to CODE DU TRAVAIL [C.TRAV.] art. L 3253-2, and CODE DE 
COMMERCE [C.COM] art. L 625-7 & L 625-8, the preferential rights of employees enjoy a 
super-priority claim over all claims, including security rights. In Italy, although the preferential 
rights of employees under art. 2751-bis of the CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] are subordinated to 
pledges, there is a plethora of preferential claims, scattered in various specialized provisions, 
which outrank certain categories of security rights. 
166. BASEL II refers, by way of examples, to the fact that registration may be a legal 
requirement. See, e.g., BASEL II, supra note 12, ¶ 123. This position is also maintained in the 
SECOND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 23, ¶ 125 and has been ultimately codified in 
BASEL III, supra note 13 ¶ 140. The CRR does not contain any reference to registration in the 
context of non-possessory security rights, whereas it requires timely registration of a mortgage 
in art. 208(2)(a). 
167. Eur. Banking Auth. (EBA), Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Assigning 
Risk Weights to Specialised Lending Exposures under Article 153(9) of Regulation (EU) No 
575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation – CRR) (EBA, Consultation Paper 
EBA/CP/2015/09, 2016). The final draft of this document is currently being examined by the 
European Commission for final approval. 
168. Id. at 34, n. 43. Emphasis has been added to highlight the term lien that appears to 
be used as a synonym of security interest. The quoted text is repeated throughout the document 
and is contained in the footnotes every time the locution “first perfected security interest” is 
used. 
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aircraft and immovable property.169 It also coincides with the general 
provisions on security rights in personal property as adopted in certain 
legal systems, including Belgium, France, Italy, as well as those 
countries following the EBRD Model Law.170 
Nonetheless, the idea that registration is the sole mechanism to 
both render security rights effective and govern their priority is not in 
line with the approach adopted in various secured transactions law 
regimes. Following a rigid interpretation, a security right that is 
perfected without registration, or for which registration does not 
exclude the existence of entitlements with a higher priority – two 
common scenarios – may not lead to a discounted capital charge. For 
instance, under English law, registration does not govern priority; 
registered floating charges are subordinate to subsequently registered 
fixed charges (unless a negative pledge has also been registered with 
the floating charge) and, in trade finance, security rights are 
commonly perfected by taking possession of the bill of lading or other 
document of title. 171  Hence, the classic English adage that states 
“fixed charge is for priority, floating charge is for control,”172 does 
not resonate with the concept of credit protection advanced in capital 
requirements, where the two elements, i.e. priority and control, should 
be concurrent rather than exclusive. In practice, this conceptual 
                                                                                                                       
169. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment ch. IV, Nov. 16, 
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285; Roy Goode, Private Commercial Law Conventions and Public and 
Private International Law: The Radical Approach of the Cape Town Convention 2001 and Its 
Protocols, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 523, 526 (2016). 
170. According to the EBRD MODEL LAW, registration is a requisite to create one of the 
three types of charges, i.e. the “registered charge;” EBRD MODEL LAW, supra note 44, art. 6.1. 
In Italy, to establish a non-possessory pledge the agreement needs to be registered. Italian 
Non-possessory Pledge Law, supra note 32, art. 1(4). However, there are other security 
instruments that do not require registration. For an overview, see Giuliano G. Castellano, The 
New Italian Law for Non-possessory Pledges: A Critical Assessment 9 BUTTERWORTHS J. 
INT’L BANKING & FINANCIAL L. 542 (2016). In France, registration is often considered as a 
substitute for dispossession. See Rapport de Mme Cohen-Branche, Conseiller Rapporteur, 
Cour de Cassation (Assemblée Plénière), Nov. 6, 2009, no. 582 (08-17.095) [Report by Mrs 
Cohen-Branche, Reporting Judge, Court of Cassation (Plenary Assembly)]. In contrast, in 
Belgium, the parties may create an enforceable pledge upon execution of an agreement. 
Belgian Pledge Act, supra note 29, art. 2. 
171. On floating charges, see supra note 51 and accompanying text. On perfection by 
taking possession of a negotiable document, including a bill of lading, see UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 26. 
172. Riz Mokal, Liquidation Expenses and Floating Charges – The Separate Funds 
Fallacy, L.M.C.L.Q. 387, 397 (2004) (referring to Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in 
Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004)). 
580 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:531 
separation elaborated by English common law is circumvented by 
combining floating charges, fixed charges and negative pledges. 
However, resorting to multiple legal instruments increases legal risk, 
as compliance with several formal requirements should be ensured 
and interpretative doubts may arise.173 Hence, the different treatment 
for fixed and floating charges, emerging from the necessity to balance 
the interests of different affected parties, 174  does not offer a 
prudentially sound legal solution. 
IV. THE UNFOLDING CONSEQUENCES 
Secured transactions law and capital requirements affect lending 
behaviors simultaneously. Although there are some difficulties in 
determining the exact impact of secured transactions law on the 
availability and cost of credit, 175  empirical analyses have found a 
positive correlation between legal reforms facilitating secured 
transactions and availability of credit.176 However, mirroring the scant 
attention to the connection between secured transactions law and 
prudential regulation, these studies – ascribed to the “law and finance” 
stream of literature – primarily focus on the correlation between 
enhancements in the protection of creditors’ rights and access to 
external finance. 177  Similarly, the banking industry associates a 
                                                                                                                       
173. For instance, there were some concerns over the effectiveness of negative pledge 
clauses and whether registration of such clauses could be inferred as a sufficient notice 
rendering them effective against third parties. See PETER E. ELLINGER, EVA LOMNICKA & 
CHRISTOPHER V. HARE, ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW 849 (5th ed. 2011). The 
problem has been largely resolved by the Companies Act, 2006 (Amendment of Part 25), c. 46, 
Regulations 2013, no. 600 (U.K.). See Louise Gullifer & Magda Raczynska, The English Law 
of Personal Property Security: Under-reformed?, in STLR: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 26, at 271. 
174. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
175. For a complete account of the most important findings in this field, see John 
Armour et al., How Do Creditor Rights Matter for Debt Finance? A Review of Empirical 
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SECURED FINANCING IN COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 3 (Frederique Dahan ed., 2015). 
176. It has also been noted that secured transactions law reforms have a greater positive 
impact on the availability of credit than insolvency law reforms. Id. at 13. See generally Rainer 
Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 23 ‎REV. FIN. STUD. 
549 (2009). 
177. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. 
FIN. 1131 (1997); see also Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113-
40 (1998). More sophisticated analyses in this field consider a broader range of protections 
given to creditors. See generally John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence 
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reduction of credit availability and economic growth with the 
introduction of tighter capital requirements – thus implying a tension 
between economic growth and financial stability as earlier 
discussed. 178  Nonetheless, official and independent studies confute 
this position, stressing that the long-term benefits of a more stable 
banking system to stimulate lending and sustain growth. 179  How 
credit is distributed in accordance with legal systems that have 
modernized their domestic secured transactions laws while 
implementing capital requirements is empirically untested. Drawing 
from the analysis conducted thus far, it is possible to advance several 
significant considerations on the broader consequences of an 
increased availability of credit in jurisdictions deploying international 
capital standards for banks, with the intent to further empirical 
analyses. 
While capital requirements apply exclusively to regulated credit 
institutions, secured transactions laws allow any individual or entity 
to act as a secured creditor. It stands to reason that the implementation 
of a reformed secured transactions law is more likely to benefit those 
lenders that are not affected by banking capital regulation, such as 
micro-lenders, leasing and factoring companies. Rather than 
understanding limited access to credit exclusively in terms of 
shortcomings in security rights regimes or as a consequence of capital 
requirements,180 the documented reluctance of banks to take personal 
property as collateral should be explained also (if not primarily) as a 
function of the lack of coordination between the legal and the 
regulatory frameworks under which banks manage credit risk. The 
provisions on eligible collateral clearly prioritize financial 
                                                                                                                       
from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 579 (2009). 
178. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
179. Different studies note that an increase of capital requirements has minimal negative 
impact on global GDP. See, e.g., Patrick Slovik & Boris Cournède, Macroeconomic Impact of 
Basel III (OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 844, 2011); See also ADMATI & 
HELLWIG, supra note 4, at 5. At the national level, see Jonathan Bridges et al., The Impact of 
Capital Requirements on Bank Lending (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 486, 2014). 
180 . The first position is often advanced by international organizations; e.g., INT’L 
FINANCE CORP. (IFC), SECURED TRANSACTIONS SYSTEMS AND COLLATERAL REGISTRIES 6-7 
(2010). In the literature, see, e.g., Mehnaz S. Safavian, Firm-Level Evidence on Collateral and 
Access to Finance, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM AND ACCESS TO CREDIT 119 
(Frederique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008). On the idea that capital regulation limits 
economic growth, see supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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instruments and receivables, limiting banks’ appetite for other 
collateral. For instance, security on intellectual property rights, 
promoted by UNCITRAL through a special set of 
recommendations, 181  may constitute an effective credit protection 
only in limited circumstances, given the intrinsic difficulties in 
assessing their value. In a similar vein, the suspicious attitude towards 
physical collateral in the Basel framework should be ascribed to the 
inherent concerns about their valuation and liquidity. 182  Historical 
data on the variety of tangible assets that may be taken as collateral is 
often unreliable or non-existent. Furthermore, even when reliable data 
can be sourced, the value of tangible assets tends to be more directly 
correlated with the borrowers’ ability to repay their obligations and 
with the general economic conditions. Tangible assets are likely to 
suffer depreciation, either as a result of the borrower’s default or as a 
reflection of the cyclical movements of the economy. 
Against this backdrop, reforming secured transactions laws is 
not sufficient to broaden access to bank credit. Furthermore, the 
benefits (financial stability and increased access to credit) sought by 
prudential regulation and secured transactions must be measured 
against the simultaneous application of their dissonant logic when 
they intersect, i.e. when banks are secured creditors. The requisites for 
credit protection to reduce capital charges naturally constrain the 
ability of banks to take a number of assets as collateral and 
incentivize them to re-allocate their resources to less risky, therefore 
less capital intensive, activities.183 The banking industry’s retraction 
                                                                                                                       
181. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS: SUPPLEMENT ON SECURITY RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2010); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 42, art. 1(3). On the relevance of security 
interests in intellectual property (IP) within current social and economic frameworks, see 
SECURITY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2017) (examining 
several critical aspects, such as the relevance of IP rights and debt financing for SMEs, cross-
border and international rules for taking, perfecting, and enforcing security in IP). For a 
forward-looking analysis concerning future legal developments to facilitate the use of IP 
licenses as collateral, see Andrea Tosato, Security Interests over IP Licenses: Comparative 
Observations and Reform Suggestions, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2018). For 
an early and critical investigation of legal frameworks allowing the use of software copyright 
as source of (secured) financing, see KIRIAKOULA HATZIKIRIAKOS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SOFTWARE AS COLLATERAL (2006). 
182 . See David Clementi, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Financial 
Services Authority Conference: Risk Sensitivity and the New Basel Accord (Apr. 10, 2001). 
183. A limited supply of commercial loans by large European and U.S. banks was noted 
during the period preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
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from these lending operations results in a vacuum that is filled by 
non-bank operators that are not subject to capital requirements. Loans 
provided by non-banks often involve collateral and borrowers that are 
deemed too risky for regulated credit institutions. Through the 
introduction of a more favorable legal regime, borrowers previously 
excluded from the credit market are more likely to receive credit, 
even if at higher interest rates. It follows that by adopting a 
modernized and simplified legal regime for taking security rights in 
collateral, access to secured credit may be broadened; but its cost is 
not necessarily reduced as a result of a greater involvement of non-
bank operators. This intuition is corroborated by empirical studies that 
register an increase in interest rates in connection with collateralized 
loans.184 
If stimulating the development of unregulated credit markets is 
an unintended effect of the interaction between these two branches of 
the law, significant policy concerns emerge. Following the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, it became clear that the Basel framework, while 
limiting excessive risk-taking, failed to impede the diversion of banks’ 
capital towards (more risky) operations outside the regulatory 
perimeters,185 thus rendering the financial system more fragile and 
regulatory strategies less effective. A core problem affecting the Basel 
framework was – and still is – represented precisely by the 
inadvertent implications caused by the common assumption of the 
                                                                                                                       
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 31 (2008). More recently, the retraction of the largest 
US banks from the market of small business financing has been noted by Brian Chen, Samuel 
Hanson & Jeremy Stein, The Decline of Big-Bank Lending to Small Business: Dynamic 
Impacts on Local Credit and Labor Markets (Harvard Business School, Working Paper, 2017), 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/BigBankSmallBiz_paper_20170905_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8S6V-W626] (archived Mar. 4, 2018). Furthermore, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) indicated that a large portion of SMEs financing in the United States and in the 
European Union is offered by non-banking institutions; see Economic Bulletin - Trends in the 
External Financing Structure of Euro Area Non-financial Corporations (Eur. Cent. Bank, 
Frankfurt, Germany), June 2016, at 29. 
184. See, e.g., Sergei A. Davydenko & Julian R. Franks, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? 
A Study of Defaults in France, Germany and the UK, 63 J. FIN. 565 (2008); James R. Booth & 
Lena C. Booth, Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing Costs, 38 J. MONEY 
CREDIT & BANKING 67 (2008); Sheng-Syan Chen, Gillian H. Yeo & Kim W. Ho, Further 
Evidence on the Determinants of Secured Versus Unsecured Loans, 25 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 
371 (1998). 
185. Black, supra note 83, at 1058 (noting that the 2007-2008 financial crisis revealed, 
inter alia, a fundamental misalignment between the incentives of regulators, regulated entities, 
and other firms operating in financial markets). 
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coefficients used to determine capital charges.186 In fact, pursuant to 
the risk-weighting logic of Basel II, certain assets, such as residential 
mortgages (and derivative products based on them), were subject to 
lower capital requirements than other investments, like corporate 
borrowings. 187  As a consequence, banks had strong incentives to 
invest in those assets in order to reduce their capital charges. 188 
Furthermore, the low level of capital required to engage in those 
investments increased banks’ leverage, increasing returns as well as 
risk exposures. These distortions in relation to residential mortgages 
have been partially addressed at the national level.189 Nonetheless, 
international capital requirements still dis-incentivize banks to accept 
personal property as collateral,190 whereas secured transactions law 
promotes their use. 
The problematic nature of this diversion is represented by the 
phenomenon of “shadow banking,” which is the activity of credit 
intermediation occurring completely or partially outside the banking 
                                                                                                                       
186. See generally, Romano, supra note 11. Capital regulation incentivizes banks to 
invest in activities that are less risky, given that they cost less in terms of capital. Therefore, 
the attribution of different risk-weightings and the processes to calculate capital charges shape 
lending behaviors by determining banks’ preferences. See Castellano & Dubovec, supra note 6. 
When capital regulation is perceived as a cost, banks may engage in practices of regulatory 
capital arbitrage, that is, the exploitation of the “differences between a portfolio’s true 
economic risks and the notions and measurements of risk implicit in regulatory capital 
standards;” David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory 
Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FINANCE 35, 40 (2000). On this 
phenomenon, see also Erik F. Gerding, The Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and 
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 357 (2016). 
187. For a convincing illustration in the context of the financial crisis, see Romano, 
supra note 11, at 13 (indicating that “a bank had to hold only $4 in capital for every $100 in 
residential mortgages, but it had to hold an even lower $1.60 for every $100 in MBSs with an 
investment grade”). 
188. For a discussion of the unintended consequences of the Basel framework, see Viral 
V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, How Banks Played the Leverage Game, in RESTORING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 83 (Viral A. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson eds., 2009); Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, 
Unintended Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., ADBI 
Working Paper No. 392, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168006.  
189. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
190. For a comparison of the risk-weighting attributed to secured lending and credit 
derivatives, see Castellano & Dubovec, Credit Creation: Reconciling Legal and Regulatory 
Incentives, supra note 6 (noting that through a credit derivative, a commercial, unsecured loan 
may require the same amount of capital that is required if that very same loan were secured by 
a Treasury bond issued by the US government; whereas, commercial loans secured with 
personal property do not benefit from such a straightforward reduction of capital). 
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system. 191  In this respect, shadow banking has been eloquently 
described as a “shadow caused by the regulatory spotlight shining 
elsewhere.”192 A parallel may be drawn with the regulatory limelight 
that, through the eligibility criteria for collateral, points towards 
specific types of security instruments and collateral, leaving other 
forms of transactions and assets in the shadow of unregulated 
financial institutions, which may fully enjoy reformed secured 
transactions laws. 
This dynamic emerges vividly from the experience of the 
People’s Republic of China. In 2007, the country reformed its law 
pertaining to secured transactions to facilitate the creation and 
enforcement of security rights in accounts receivable, and equipment 
financing. 193 Prior to the enactment of the new law, factoring and 
leasing products were largely unavailable. The establishment of a new 
legal framework and a registry system maintained by the national 
central bank, The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), significantly 
stimulated the growth of the leasing and factoring industries. 194 
Simultaneously, the uncontrolled growth of debt accumulation outside 
the traditional banking system is, in China and elsewhere, one of the 
primary sources of concern. 195 
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Chinese Shadow Banking System, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 30 (2015) (noting that regulatory 
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banking system). For a broader perspective of the stability concerns in the regulatory 
framework, see Emilios Avgouleas & Duoqi Xu, Overhauling China’s Financial Stability 
Regulation: Policy Riddles and Regulatory Dilemmas, 4 ASIAN J. OF L. & SOC. 1 (2017) 
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From the above, it appears that capital requirements contribute to 
shaping a market for secured credit in which assets or transactions 
deemed too risky to serve as eligible credit protection are instead 
employed by non-bank institutions. Whether the development of this 
form of credit outside the banking system is beneficial or poses a 
systemic threat depends on a number of factors.196 Shadow banking 
activities in the form of asset-based lending, factoring and leasing, or 
even online lending, 197  are means to increase liquidity in the real 
economy and promote growth. 198  However, the uncontrolled 
development of this phenomenon poses serious risks. Since shadow 
banking institutions are highly leveraged, they are easily affected by 
cyclical movements in the value of collateral and are prone to 
liquidity shortages and defaults. Moreover, regulated banks are often 
part of the shadow-banking chain, to which they provide (directly or 
indirectly) funds, often by acquiring loans originated by shadow 
lenders.199 Therefore, depending on the dimension of the non-banking 
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AMERICAN BANKER (Aug. 17, 2015, 9:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
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The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. (forthcoming 
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their algorithms in order to measure the levels of risk of small borrowers who, in turn, are 
considered too risky by international banking regulation). 
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market and its connection with the banking system, systemic concerns 
may arise and, more generally, an uncontrolled accumulation of debt 
may lead to financial instability, as Minsky noted.200 
The concomitant application of these two branches of law leads 
to two intertwined consequences. First, the effectiveness of secured 
transactions law reforms is curtailed by a regulatory framework that 
requires credit institutions to treat loans secured by collateral in the 
same guise as unsecured credit. Second, the availability of credit is 
fueled by financial institutions operating outside the banking system. 
Hence, the uncoordinated intersection of secured transactions laws 
and capital requirements, rather than their discrete application, 
hinders both access to credit and financial stability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While equally concerned with the management of credit risk, 
secured transactions law and prudential regulation follow distinctive 
rationales and operational logics. The legal regimes governing 
security rights balance the antithetic interests of the parties affected 
by those rights. Within the boundaries imposed by such a balance, 
secured creditors and debtors enjoy significant freedom in negotiating 
the terms of their security agreement. In addition, valuation of the 
collateral, determination of the amount lent against its value, the 
frequency and mechanics of inspections and the general 
creditworthiness of a loan applicant are not a matter of secured 
transactions law. Conversely, prudential regulation, through capital 
requirements, controls the risk associated with banking activities. 
Hence, for the purpose of reducing capital charges, regulatory 
provisions recognize security rights as a valid form of credit 
protection only when they are deemed to curb the risks of failure of 
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and Shadow Banking Entities (European Systemic Risk Board, Working Paper Series No. 40, 
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individual banks and promote the stability of the financial system. To 
wit, balancing the interests of the parties affected by a security 
instrument do not necessarily lead to rules – on creation, perfection, 
priority, and enforcement of security rights – that accommodate the 
interests of public regulation. 
The regulatory treatment of security rights over receivables, 
financial collateral and tangible assets reveals the depth of the 
dissonances between secured transactions law and capital 
requirements. These dissonances, in turn, have broad policy 
implications. In this respect, the assumption that reforming the law 
pertaining to security rights increases access to credit, by reducing its 
costs, is questionable. An uncontrolled accumulation of debt outside 
the banking system is ultimately stimulated when secured transactions 
law – facilitating credit creation – and capital requirements – limiting 
banks’ appetite for certain types of security instruments and collateral 
– are applied concomitantly and in an uncoordinated fashion. As a 
result, availability of credit remains constrained and stability concerns 
emerge. Resolving these dissonances requires more than a mere 
attentiveness in legal drafting. International standard-setters and 
national law-makers should reconsider the policy aims and the 
beneficiaries of secured transactions law and prudential regulation, 
having in view that these two branches of the law intersect. 
